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Article 4

SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE HORIZONTAL
FORCE OF PRECEDENT
Richard W Murphy*
On the subject of the bank alone is there a colour for the charge of
mutability on a constitutional question. But here the inconsistency
is apparent, not real, since the change was in conformity to al early
and unchanged opinion, that, in the case of a Constitution as of a law,
a course of authoritative, deliberate, and continued decisions, such
as the bank could plead, was an evidence of the public judgment, necessarily superseding individual opinions. There has been a fallacy in
this case, as, indeed, in others, in confounding a question whether
precedents could expound a Constitution, with a question whether
they could alter a Constitution. This distinction is too obvious to
need elucidation. None will deny that precedents of a certain
description fix the interpretation of a law. Yet who will pretend that
they can repeal or alter a law? '
INTRODUCTION

Late in his life, James Madison defended himself against the
charge that he had flip-flopped on the constitutionality of the Bank of
the United States by arguing that his surface inconsistency reflected a
deeper and consistent allegiance to a form of stare decisis: 2 prece*

Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. My thanks to

everyone whom I forced to discuss precedent and separation of powers with me or
read drafts of this Article, especially Michael Stokes Paulsen, Russell Pannier, Eileen
Scallen, Jay Krishnan, Raleigh Levine, Daniel Kleinberger, Michael Steenson, and
Robert Oliphant.
I Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 204, 211 (Joint Comm'n on the Libr. of Cong. ed.,
Phila., J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867) [hereinafter LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS] (emphases added).
2 "Stare decisis" may be roughly defined to include any doctrine that imposes an
obligation on courts to follow precedents because they are precedents rather than
because they seem correct on their substantive merits. Cf Fredrick Schauer, Precedent,
39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 575 (1987) (noting that when arguing from precedent, "the fact
that something was decided before gives it present value despite our current belief
that the previous decision was erroneous"). Note that this definition is sufficiently
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dents provide "evidence" of "public judgment[s]" that can "fix" interpretation of vague constitutional text." He had abandoned his
original analysis that the Bank was unconstitutional because a series of
"authoritative, deliberate, and continued decisions"-by Congress, executive officials, and state legislatures, as well as the courts-signified
a public judgment that disagreed with him and was plausible enough
4
to amount to constitutional interpretation rather than alteration.
To the degree Madison relied on the force ofjudicial precedent
tojustify his flip-flop, his defense was anything but novel. The major
legal thinkers of the common-law tradition of his day embraced the
declaratory theory of precedent, which limited judicial discretion by
5
requiring courts to treat their earlier opinions as "evidence" of law.
The evidentiary force of precedents creates a presumption that they
should be followed. To justify overruling a precedent, a court must
overcome this presumption by offering countervailing "evidence" in
the form of an explanation of why the target precedent was unreasonably and seriously mistaken." Both sides in the ratification debates
subscribed to this understanding and shared Madison's expectation
that the new federal Constitution would, like lesser law, be subject to
7
such precedential "fixative" effects.
broad to capture both the "strict" doctrine that precedents are 'strictly binding" law
that courts must follow, as well as the weaker doctrine that treats precedents as presumptively correct and requires courts to give cogent, legal reasons for abandoning
them.

3

Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist, supra note 1, in 4 LErITERS AND OTHER
sulrfa note 1, at 204, 211.
1I.; see also Letter from James Madison to James Monroe; President of the

WRITINGS,

4

United States (Dec. 27, 1817), in 3

LEYI-ERS AND OTIER WRITINGS,

supra note 1, at 54,

55-56 (noting precedential weight of congressional, executive, state, and popular
judgments).
5 See, e.g., I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71 ("Upon the whole, however, we may take it as a general rule, 'that the decisions of the courts ofjustice are
the evidence of what is common law."'). See generally infra Part I.A.
6 There are, of course, a number of ways to express the rough idea that courts
should show substantial but not absolute deference to precedents. Insofar as the declaratory-theory requires courts to follow precedents with which they can "agree to
disagree," as it were, it resembles the Chevron doctrine that courts must defer to "reasonable" agency interpretations of their organic statutes. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For an illuminating treatment of the thesis
that stare decisis should be understood to require Chevron-like deference to earlier
judicial opinions, see Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents,
87 VA. L. REv. 1 (2001).
7 See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing Federalist and Anti-Federalist remarks concerning expected effects of precedents on constitutional interpretation).
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But the Framers did not write this expectation into the Constitution itself, which contains no express reference to "precedent" whatsoever.8 Indeed, neither the records of the Constitutional Convention
nor the ratification debates much discuss either the nature of the "judicial power" or its mode of operation. 9 This silence has created
room for roiling separation-of-powers debates regarding the scope of
both judicial and congressional authority to "unfix" legal meaning by
eliminating the courts' obligation to defer to their own precedents
(i.e., "horizontal" stare decisis). H Resolving these debates leads to a
conclusion which, while it may seem counterintuitive to those
schooled to the idea that courts exercise absolute control over the
process of legal interpretation, fits Madison's vision that the
majoritarian branches of government, too, should play a role in "fixing" legal and constitutional meaning: Congress has substantial power
to free the courts from the horizontal force of precedents, but the
courts lack the power to free themselves.
Debate over the power of the courts to alter precedential norms
has revolved around the constitutionality of circuit court rules that
permit appellate court panels to issue "unpublished"" opinions that
lack horizontal precedential force and thus do not bind later panels of
the same court to any degree.' 2 Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth
8 See U.S. CONST. art. II1, §§ 1-2 (vesting "judicial power of the United States" in
the judicial department and setting forth categories of cases and controversies to
which it may extend).
9 See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 202-03 (2001) (observing that "the 'judicial
power' in 1789 was not a term with a lengthy, well-understood history" and that it did
not "receive[ ] serious attention during the founding period"); cf. W.B. GwYN, TuLANE STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE IX: THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
101 (1965) (noting that "English writers before Montesquieu's time [in the mid-eighteenth century] usually did not distinguish between executive and judicial functions in
classifying governmental power").
10 Confusingly, the phrase "stare decisis" captures both "horizontal" and "vertical" restrictions on judicial decision making. Horizontal norms determine how much

deference courts must show to their own past decisions or those of other courts at an
equivalent level within a judicial hierarchy. Vertical norms determine the obligation
of courts to defer to higher courts within a given judicial system. See inf'ra notes 35-41

and accompanying text. This Article will focus on the power of the courts and Congress to eliminate the horizontal norm that courts must defer to some degree to their
own past decisions. For citations to discussions of the constitutional status of vertical
stare decisis, see infra note 41.
11 The quotation marks refer to the fact that "unpublished" opinions are easily
accessible online.
12 These rules alter the operation of horizontal stare decisis insofar as they affect
panel to panel relations. Of course, as they eliminate the force of appellate opinions
on district courts, they also affect operation of vertical stare decisis.
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Circuit stirred controversy in 2000 in Anastasoff v. United States,' 3 in
which he held that issuance of such nonprecedents cannot be reconciled with the federal courts' Article III 'judicial power," which he believes imposes on courts a duty to defer to their precedents along the
lines once demanded by the declaratory theory.14 According to judge
Arnold, a court cannot evade the force of its own inconvenient, onpoint precedents by ignoring them; rather, the court should follow
such a precedent unless the court can make a "convincingly clear"
case why it should be overruled. 15 In 2001, Judge Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit fired back with Hart v. Massanari,16 opining that the
practice of issuing nonprecedents is a perfectly constitutional response to the crushing litigation burdens courts now face. 17 Scholarly
commentary, by and large, has taken an anti-Anastasoffview.' 8
The power of Corgress to regulate the operation of stare decisis
has sparked recent and interesting scholarly foment. Although the
Supreme Court long ago junked the declaratory theory, its shadow
lives on in the doctrine that the Court will not overrule a precedent
13 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th
Cir. 2000).
14 Id. at 899-905 (holding that Eighth Circuit Rule 28A(i), which provides that
"[u]npublished decisions are not precedent," is unconstitutional); see also Williams v.
Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2001) (dissent from denial
of rehearing en banc) (describing as "questionable" the "practice of denying precedential status to unpublished opinions").
15 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 904-05.
16 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
17 Id. at 1180 ("Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within Article
Ill of the Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders issued by
appellate courts be binding authority."); see also Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson
Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (following Hart).
18 See, e.g., R. Ben Brown, Judging in the Days of the Early Republic: A CritiqueofJudge
Richard Arnold's Use of History in Anastasoff v. United States, 3J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
355, 356-60 (2001) (concluding thatJudge Arnold's analysis of the constraining effects of precedent on courts fails to give due consideration to the unsettled nature of
the judicial power at the time of the founding); John Harrison, The Power of Congress
over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L. 503, 525 (2000) (concluding that "[i]t is highly
unlikely that when the Constitution was adopted Americans believed that the principle of stare decisis was hard-wired into the concept of judicial power"); Thomas R.
Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial Power To "Unpublish"
Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 140 (2001) (concluding "that the founding-era
conception of precedent cannot be reconciled with the historical model proposed by
Judge Arnold"). But see PollyJ. Price, Precedent andJudicial Power After the Founding,42
B.C. L. REV. 81, 83 (2000) (defending Anastasoff on nonoriginalist grounds and arguing that the "core meaning of judicial power" requires some measure of respect for
precedent on equal-justice grounds).
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absent a "special justification" beyond mere disagreement.1 9 The
Court sometimes invokes this doctrine to justify adhering to prece20
dents while at the same time hinting they are wrong on their merits.
Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen provocatively argues that the Constitution's silence on precedent leaves room for Congress to strip
targeted Supreme Court opinions of any such force. 2 1 He directs his
ire at Roe v. Wade22 and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,23 but no doubt
persons from all ideological corners could identify opinions they
would like to subject to this treatment. ProfessorJohn Harrison balks
at the claim that Congress may manipulate precedential force to attempt to affect constitutional doctrine but concludes that most stare
19 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (observing that
"[w]hile stare decisis is not an inexorable command, particularly when we are interpreting the Constitution, even in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a departure from precedent to be
supported by some 'special justification'" (citations and internal punctuation omitted)); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863-64 (1992) (stating that a court
should have "some special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was
wrongly decided" to justify overruling). For discussion of the Court's statements of
the level of justification required to overrule precedent, see Thomas R. Lee, Stare
Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 647, 667-81 (1999).
20 Precedential force may have been dispositive in at least two important, relatively recent decisions. Given the current conservative makeup of the Court, it seems
likely that, absent stare decisis effects, it would have overruled rather than reaffirmed
Miranda in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) ("Whether or not we
would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the
issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling
it now."). Likewise, the joint opinion in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey purported to rely
on stare decisis to justify reaffirming Roe. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 861 (1992) ("Within
the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis ... the stronger argument is for affirming
Roe's central holding, with whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us may have
....");see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress
Remove the PrecedentialEffect of Roe and Casey ?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1539 n.12 (2000)
(identifying Supreme Court opinions that may have turned on application of stare
decisis).
21 See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1538-43. More specifically, Professor Paulsen
argues: (1) the Supreme Court describes stare decisis as merely a matter of "policy"
rather than "an inexorable command"; (2) Congress is in charge of policymaking;
and therefore concludes (3) Congress has authority to strip individual cases of their
precedential force. Id.; see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 723, 754 (1988) (posing the question "whether Congress could demand that the Court reconsider its precedents, free of any supposed
compulsion introduced by stare decisis").
22 404 U.S. 113 (1973).
23 Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional
Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).'
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decisis norms are best characterized as creatures of general and statutory law, which leaves space for Congress to legislate "any norm of
stare decisis that a court reasonably could recognize." 24 By way of contrast (and in direct response to Paulsen) Professor Richard Fallon
maintains that stare decisis must enjoy constitutional status "[i] n light
of longstanding acceptance and considerations of justice and prudence"-and that to conclude otherwise requires adoption of an unrealistic methodology for constitutional interpretation. 25
All of these courts and scholars are both right and wrong after a
fashion. Those who, like Judge Arnold, claim that separation-of-powers principles block the courts from abandoning their traditional respect for precedent are correct but fail to appreciate the true source
of this requirement and its limits. Those who, like Paulsen, contend
or assume that stare decisis has no constitutional import are not looking quite hard enough for it, but the claim that Congress may legislate
away the horizontal, coercive force of precedent is nonetheless at least
partially correct. The key to reconciling these inconsistent-sounding
claims is to recognize and harmonize two competing separation-ofpowers principles: (1) the rule of law forbids officials from seizing
more power than the law grants them; and (2) Congress, the
lawmaker, has considerable discretion to delegate discretionary power
to the executive and judicial branches (collectively, the "enforcing
branches"). 2" The first of these principles compels the conclusion
that courts cannot constitutionally eliminate their obligation, deeply
rooted in common law, to show measured (though not absolute) deference to their own precedents. The second, however, suggests that
Congress possesses power to release the courts from this constraint.
Separation of powers permits Congress to grant a power that the
27
courts may not legally seize.
24 Harrison, supra note 18, at 540 (concluding that Congress may regulate stare
decisis to achieve systemic ends (for example, to enhance stability, predictability, and
judicial economy) but that it may not manipulate precedent to force courts to adopt

congressionally favored interpretations of the Constitution).
25 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution:An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 596 (2001).

26 Both the executive and the judicial branches carry out the "executive" function
of enforcing the law, albeit the judiciary does so in the limited context of meting out
judgments in cases and controversies initiated by either the executive or private parties. See infra text accompanying note 166. I refer to both as "enforcing branches" to
capture this commonality because using the phrase "executive branches" would be
confusing for obvious reasons.
27 Note: this Article confines its attention to the separation-of-powers concerns
raised by the elimination of the horizontal force of precedents. Some have suggested

or argued that "nonprecedents" also raise equal protection and due process concerns.
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The primary thrust of separation of powers is to forestall tyranny
by ensuring that enforcement officials with the power to act directly
on the governed (i.e., hurt them) find their discretion to do so limited
by law. 28 Such a scheme cannot work if officials are free to expand

their powers by changing the law that limits their authority. It should
obviously follow that judges may not legally "make up" new laws that
increase their discretionary power. The deference to precedent demanded by the declaratory theory operated as a substantial, albeit
fuzzy, legal constraint on judicial discretion. 29 . The tempting mistake
See, e.g., Price, supra note 18, at 83 (arguing that abandoning respect for precedent
"would mock the notion of equal justice");Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished
Opinions, Precedent, and the Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential
Value Is Unconstitutional,50 U. KAN. L. REv. 195, 211 (2001) ("Denying precedential value to unpublished opinions offends both procedural due process and equal
protection."). The gist of such arguments seems to be that freeing the courts from
precedents creates the danger that they will treat similarly situated parties dissimilarly
and might unfairly deny litigants the clarifying effects of precedents on indeterminate
laws. By way of a tentative response: with regard to equal-treatment concerns, although the law condemns invidious discrimination, it does not require that every effort be made to ensure that all litigants receive identical treatment. Circuit court
splits are commonplace; different juries may find different facts on the same evidence. Equality of treatment is one value among many prized by the adjudicative
process; getting the law right is another. It is not obvious that these competing values
should be balanced in a way that requires courts to follow precedents they deem incorrect. With regard to due process, to the degree stripping opinions of their precedential force makes laws less clear, this practice could in theory cause an especially
vague statute to violate the void-for-vagueness principle. This muddled doctrine is
chiefly concerned with constraining police discretion to enforce criminal laws arbitrarily or impinge on First Amendment rights. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion
and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 551, 604 (1997). To survive a due-process vagueness challenge, a law
prohibiting conduct need only create "minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983). It need not be as specific as possible. See-Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7
(1982) (finding that absent a claim of impingement on constitutional rights, a vagueness challenge requires proof that enactment specifies "no standard of conduct"); cf.
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (upholding Sherman Act standard
that "unreasonable" restraints of trade are criminal against vagueness challenge). It
should follow that there are many contexts in which Congress could strip the precedential force from various opinions and still leave the law with more than enough
clarity to survive this form of due-process challenge.
28 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514 U.S. 211, 241 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the role of separation of powers in preserving "impartial rule of law"
and ensuring that "even an unfair law at least will be applied evenhandedly according
to its terms"); GwvN, supra note 9, at 104-06 (discussing the rule-of-law rationale underlying Montesquieu's and Blackstone's discussions of separation of powers).
29 But is stare decisis a constraint? Some contend that stare decisis is too fuzzy
and easily manipulated by judges to carry much real force-especially at the Supreme
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is to conclude that, because courts created the norms of common-law
precedent in the first place, they retained the power to abandon
them. The source of stare decisis in 'judge-made" law (to use the
modern idiom) does nothing, however, to alter application of the separation-of-powers principle that forbids judicial power grabs The federal courts have always operated under a constitutional obligation to
enforce the law; the law at their inception required them to have a
substantial justification for departing from or ignoring their own
precedents, and the courts lack the constitutional power to change
that law in a way that increases their discretion.
The rule-of-law principle that courts (and the executive, for that
matter) cannot seize discretionary power does not, however, prevent
Congress from granting it-provided doing so falls within one of its
enumerated powers and does not otherwise violate any other separation-of-powers principles. Congress has at least some power to eliminate the horizontal force of precedent pursuant to its Sweeping
Clause authority to enact laws that are "necessary and proper" for "carrying into execution" the judicial power."') Reaching this conclusion
requires analysis of two separation-of-powers concerns that are intertwined with Sweeping Clause analysis. First, it obviously cannot be
"proper" for Congress to enact laws that usurp rather than "carry[ ]
into execution" the judicial power.3 ' The line between the two is not
clear. That said, congressional elimination of horizontal stare decisis
should not amount to usurpation because it would not enable Congress to force its legal views on the courts; rather, it would merely
enable courts to revisit their interpretations of law without giving distorting weight to their past decisions.
A second separation-of-powers concern is that releasing the
courts from the constraining effects of stare decisis could conceivably
Court level. It is certainly true that one cannot take judicial discussions of stare decisis at face value-for one thing, given the complexity of cognitive processes that occur
in judicial (and other) brains, it is safe to hazard thatjudges themselves do not understand the full effects of stare decisis on their decisions. In any event, this Article will

accept as an axiom that jtdicial commitment to stare decisis sometimes affects case
outcomes. For a recent, nuanced, empirical analysis that concludes that precedents
do in fact significantly constrain later Supreme Court decisionmaking and explores
how they do, see Mark J. Richards & Herbert M. Kritzer, JurisprudentialRegimes in
Supreme Court Decision Making, 96 Am. POL. Sci. REX. 305, 315-16 (2002). For examples of Supreme Court cases in which precedential force may have played a dispositive

role, see supra note 20.
30 U.S. CoNs'r. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
31 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of Federal Power: A
JurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE LJ. 267, 271-72 (1993) (discussing the "propriety" requirements of the Necessary and Proper Clause).
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increase their discretion in some contexts to arbitrary (in other words,
"legislative") levels, and a law that has such an effect would not carry
into execution a properly 'judicial" power. Analysis of this point is
complex and necessarily somewhat speculative because the relationship between stare decisis and the constitutional limits on enforcement-branch discretion has not been much explored. In theory, the
nondelegation doctrine blocks Congress from granting full-blown,
legislative discretion to enforcement-branch officials. The courts have
found it impossible to delineate meaningful limits on how much discretion may be exercised consistent with this principle and, in the
past, have ceded almost plenary authority to Congress to delegate as
much discretionary power as it sees fit.32 The nondelegation doc-

trine's current, dead-letter form suggests that it would be almost impossible for Congress to grant the courts an unconstitutional amount
of power by releasing them from the discretion-reducing effects of
stare decisis.
Such analysis, however, fails to consider that the nondelegation
doctrine evolved into its current weak form in a system that expects
stare decisis to ratchet down judicial discretion over time. By operating as a mechanism that automatically tends to reduce judicial discretion to "safe" levels, stare decisis perhaps relieved the pressure on the
courts to confront seriously the problem of determining how much
discretion they may constitutionally exercise. Strip this mechanism
away, and the pressure may build. The pragmatic upshot: were Congress to take a blunderbuss approach to depriving judicial precedents
of the power to narrow vague statutes over time, the courts might respond by trying to put teeth into the nondelegation doctrine and
striking as unconstitutionally vague statutes that pose no problem
whatsoever under that doctrine in its current form.
Of course, it should not be surprising that the limits of congressional power in an unexplored area of constitutional law are murky.
This murk duly noted, the long history of permitting both executive
and judicial officials to wield substantial discretion at congressional
behest suggests that Congress has ample authority to take relatively
"modest" steps to limit the horizontal force of precedent. For example, it could target select constitutional precedents as Paulsen suggests, or it might adopt more systemic reforms, such as depriving all
future five-to-four Supreme Court opinions of their horizontal force
32 See, e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (setting
forth examples of extremely broad and vague delegations that the Court has approved; noting that, "[i] n the history of the Court we have found the requisite 'intelligible principle' lacking in only two statutes").
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on the ground that such splintered opinions should not purport to
"settle" the law.
The plan: Part I of this Article will explore the Framers' views
concerning the legal and constitutional status of the declaratory theory of precedent. Contrary to Anastasoff there is insufficient evidence
to justify the conclusion that they believed that any given doctrine of
stare decisis necessarily inhered in the definition of Article III's 'judicial power." Nonetheless, it seems quite clear that the Framers expected the new federal courts to treat their past decisions as evidence
of law and to adhere to them absent a strong justification to the contrary. This expectation was rooted in their understanding that this
approach to precedent.was settled law, and they would have rejected
out of hand the notion thatjudges might possess the legislative power
to rewrite this law to increase their own power. With this historical
analysis as backdrop, Part II offers a separation-of-powers analysis of
the scope ofjudicial and congressional authority to change this law by
eliminating the force of horizontal stare decisis. The principle that
courts may not seize power for themselves prevents them from abandoning this constraint of their own accord. Congress, however, has
substantial power to release the courts from the horizontal force of
(many) precedents. In light of these lessons, Part III concludes that
rules authorizing courts to issue "nonprecedents" of the sort condemned in Anastasoff do not violate separation-of-powers principles
provided that Congress has authorized them; and, in a rather
hypertechnical sense, perhaps it already has by way of the Rules Enabling Act.:3 Lastly, Part IV briefly ruminates on the normative import
of the most controversial implication of this analysis-that Congress
may strip Supreme Court constitutional interpretations of their horizontal weight on the Court's later decisionmaking. It guardedly concludes that granting Congress such a limited role in constitutional
interpretation would be legitimate and might even be a good idea.
And, to invoke for what it is worth the "Father-of-our-Constitution"
argument, it explains why Madison might well have agreed.

33 Circuit courts may "prescribe rules for the conduct of their business" that are
"consistent with Acts of Congress and [general] rules of practice and procedure" pre-

scribed by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 (a), 2072(a), 2074(a) (2002).
Each circuit court has promulgated a local rule regarding publication of opinions and

their precedential status, though their specifics vary. See Melissa M. Serfass &Jessie L.
Cranford, Federaland State Court Rules GoverningPublicationand Citation of Opinions,3J.
Ai,'. PRAC. &

PROCESS

251, 253-57 (2001) (setting forth local rule from each circuit).
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LESSONS FROM THE FOUNDING: STARE DEC[SIS AS A LEGAL
OBLIGATION WITH SEPARATION-OF-POWERS IMPLICATIONS

This Part first clears some conceptual underbrush by distinguishing declaratory-theory stare decisis from various other precedential
norms that have evolved over the last two centuries to encrust American judicial processes. It then documents that the declaratory theory's approach to precedent was established common "law" around
the time of the founding. The Framers' expectations regarding how
this law would relate to the new Constitution were inchoate and complex. On the one hand, contrary to Anastasoff they did not bury a
specific doctrine regarding precedential force in the definition of the
Article III 'judicial power." On the other, prominent thinkers on
both sides of the ratification debate expected that the new federal
courts would defer to their own precedents as they accumulated.
None of these founding-era jurists gave anything like a full-blown legal
or constitutional analysis of the basis for this expectation, but their
limited remarks suggest the importance of two principles: (1) respect
for precedent is one means to prevent courts from exercising "arbitrary" (legislative or tyrannical) discretion; and (2) courts, as law-finders rather than lawmakers, cannot change the law to increase their
own powers.
A.

The Declaratory Theory at the Time of the Founding: Precedents as
Rebuttable Evidence of Law

Any attempt to explore the constitutional status of the doctrine of
stare decisis must first confront the question: which one? The notion
that courts should show a measure of respect to their past decisions
has been a part of Anglo-American law since the Middle Ages and has
been evolving ever since.3 4 On American soil, both federal and state
courts now labor under an array of "horizontal" and "vertical" precedential norms-some of which are quite modern. 3 5 Horizontal norms
address the weight courts give their own earlier decisions or those of
courts of equal rank. For instance, federal circuit court panels are
34 See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1162-69 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing
evolution of stare decisis in England and America); 12 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAw 146--57 (1938) (tracing evolution of doctrine of precedent in England); 1 THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
342-50 (5th ed. 1956) (same); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a ConstitutionalRequire-

nent, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 54-91 (2001) (tracing evolution of doctrine of precedent
from medieval England to post-revolutionary America).

35 For an illuminating discussion of this welter of norms and their legal sources,
see especially Harrison, supra note 18, at 506-31.
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strictly bound by earlier panel decisions from their own circuit but
give only persuasive weight to decisions from other circuits.3 6 By contrast, the Supreme Court treats its past decisions as neither absolutely
binding nor merely persuasive; as mentioned above, it purports to defer to its past decisions to the degree of requiring a "special justification" for overruling them .37 Vertical stare decisis, by contrast, has
been commonly understood to make higher court decisions strictly
binding on the lower courts within a given hierarchy. 8
As Professor Harrison recently has explained, many of these
norms are best regarded as products of statutory or common law. 'J
Some have evolved to suit judicial structures that are themselves the
product of serendipitous statutory design and lack any constitutional
basis. For instance, the rule that a circuit court's decision operates
with merely persuasive force outside its congressionally drawn jurisdiction was not inevitable; old authority suggests the proposition that one
circuit could indeed "bind" another. 4 1 A few scholars have even argued that the Constitution does not of its own force impose the vertical stare decisis norm that higher court rulings strictly bind lower
4
courts. 1

Underlying the complex of doctrines that constitutes the modern
law(s) of stare decisis lies an older understanding of the coercive
force of judicial opinions that was entrenched in common-law jurisprudence at and about the time of founding-the declaratory theory
of precedent. Again, on this view, ajudicial opinion is not itself "law,"
but is instead rebuttable "evidence" of law. Roughly speaking, the
functional effect of this doctrine is that courts should defer to precedents that fall within what might be characterized as a zone of reason36
37
38

Id. at 516-17.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 817, 820 (1994) (describing the "doctrine of hierarchical precedent" as
"a virtually undiscussed axiom of adjudication").
39 See generally Harrison, supra note 18, at 525-31 (discussing history of stare decisis in American law).
40 Id. at 516 (citing Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 F. 785, 791-92 (8th Cir. 1895)).
41 Id. at 518 (concluding that "it is not obvious either that appellate jurisdiction
determines the scope of [vertical] stare decisis or that the force of vertical precedent
is absolute"); see also Paul L. Colby, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court
Decisions: Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in JudicialOpinions, 61 TUL. L.
REV. 1041, 1058 (1987) (describing "deductive" view that higher court opinions are
"suasive" authority for lower courts); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some
Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 85

(1990) (arguing that inferior court repudiation of higher court precedent is "not constitutionally insubordinat').
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able legal interpretation. 4 2 In other words, a judge should not reject a
precedent merely because she would have decided the case differently
given the chance in a case of first impression. Rather, not to put a
misleadingly fine point on the matter, to justify overruling a precedent, the judge must demonstrate that it is seriously flawed.
The most prominent and influential exponent of this theory was,
of course, William Blackstone, whose Commentarieswere ready at hand
to jurists in the late eighteenth century.431 For him, the source of the
common law's legitimacy was that it was based on "custom" or "immemorial usage. ' 44 But how is one to figure out which practices are customary? One should ask the judges, for they are "the depositaries of
the laws; the living oracles, who must decide in all cases of doubt, and
who are bound by an oath to decide according to the law of the
land. ' 45 And how do the judges become such "depositaries"? They
study the law, of course, and the judicial decisions of their predecessors "are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be
given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the
'46
common law."

For Blackstone, old law is good law, and judges cannot legitimately make new law according to their "private sentiments" for two
42 For an extended and informative defense of this proposition, see Nelson, supra
note 6, at 8-45 (arguing that stare decisis in antebellum America limited discretion of
judges to depart from reasonable interpretations of indeterminate law but did not
prevent judges from rejecting precedents that contained "demonstrable errors," i.e.,
that fell outside the zone of reasonable interpretation).
43 Chief Justice Marshall described the authority of the prominent English treatise-writers, including Blackstone, as follows,
Principles laid down by such writers as Coke, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone,
are not lightly to be rejected. These books are in the hands of every student.
Legal opinions are formed upon them; and those opinions are afterwards
carried to the bar, the bench, and the legislature ....

[TIhe definitions and

the dicta of those authors, if not contradicted by adjudications, and if compatible with the words of the statute, are entitled to respect.
United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 160 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693). For further
discussion of Blackstone's influence, see, for example, Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d
1155, 1165 (9th Cir. 2001) ("For centuries, the most important sources of law were
not judicial opinions themselves, but treatises that restated the law, such as the commentaries of Coke and Blackstone."); DANIELJ. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE
OF THE LAW 3 (1941) ("[Blackstone's] Commentafies were not merely an approach to
the study of law; for most lawyers they constituted all there was of the law."); and 1 ST.
GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES iv-v (St. George Tucker ed., Augustus
Kelley Publishers 1969) (1803) (noting that Blackstone's work constituted the sole
source of legal knowledge for many students of the law in the former colonies).
44 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *68.
45 1 id. at *69.
46 1 id.
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reasons: (1) they simply lack the legislative power to do so; and (2)
permitting judges to legislate introduces instability and uncertainty
into the law. 4 7 It follows from all these points that a judge should
generally follow the best "evidence" of old law-the decisions of his

predecessors:
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same

points come again in litigation; as well to keep the scale of justice
even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's
opinion; as also because the law in that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to
his private sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according
to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
customs of the land; not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
48
maintain and expound the old one.
This strong statement goes a long way toward giving judicial opinions the same practical effect as law, but not all the way, for Blackstone
hastened to add,
Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former determination is
most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly contrary to

the divine law. But even in such cases the subsequentjudges do not
pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was
bad law, but that it was not law .... 4
Customs, and thus the common law, must be consistent with "reason" and therefore unreasonable precedents cannot be accurate statements of law. Blackstone knew full well, of course, that this rationality
caveat threatened to swallow his general rule of deference to precedent-for many people have the habit of condemning as unreasonable all propositions with which they disagree. He therefore attempted
to confine the range of this exception by granting precedents a strong
presumption of rationality:
[W]hat is not reason is not law. Not that the particular reason of
every rule in the law can at this distance of time be always precisely
assigned; but it is sufficient that there be nothing in the rule flatly
contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume it to be well
founded ....
47
48
49

The doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents

See I id.
1 id. (emphasis added).
1 id. at *69-70 (first emphasis added).
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and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust, for though
their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former5 times, as not to suppose they acted wholly without
consideration. 11
Therefore, ajudge is not free to ignore a precedent stating a rule
of law merely because that judge is unable to discern a rational basis
for that rule. Rather, the judge must presume rationality and follow
the rule unless he or she is able to explain why it is "flatly contradictory to reason" or, synonymously, "flatly absurd or unjust." Note that
these formulae imply that degrees of rationality exist; the existence of
"flatly absurd" opinions implies that "somewhat absurd" and "pretty
bad but maybe not all that absurd" opinions must exist, too. Apparently, courts should follow rather than overrule precedents that fall
into these less odious categories. The upshot of this discussion is that,
for Blackstone, overruling a precedent requires, to shift to modern
Supreme Court vernacular for a moment, some sort of "[really] spemust somehow be seriously wrong.
cial justification" 5 '-it
The strength of the commitment to precedent in America at and
near the time of the founding has been the subject of debate. Scholars have famously characterized the post-revolutionary era as a period
in which courts embraced an activist, instrumentalist understanding
of their role as lawmakers and would not let precedents stand in the
way of improving policy.5 2 Others have questioned this thesis, arguing
that most judges of the time valued precedent highly and did not regard themselves as "innovators." 53 To some degree, this debate over
the level of fealty to precedent is a matter of characterization of the
cup half-empty or half-full variety. Clearly, for jurists of the early Republic, precedents did not function as "strictly binding" law-a concept totally at odds with the underpinnings of the declaratory theory.
If one starts from an anachronistic "strict" theory as a comparative
baseline, then one can safely state that that these jurists had relatively
little regard for precedent. Reading early American jurists on their
own "declaratory theory" terms, however, demonstrates what is for the
present purpose the important point: generally speaking, they embraced the view that precedents should be treated as evidence of law
50 1 id. at *70 (emphases added) (footnote omitted).
51 See supra note 19.
52 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HIsroRY OF AMERICAN LAW 135 (2d ed.
1985).
53 PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEA): JUDGE-MADE Lxw IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERIcA 27 (1997) ("Most American jurists were extremely uneasy about up-

ending rules that had come down to them from generations of respected English
(and some American) jurists.").
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that should be followed absent a demonstrably good reason to reject
them. It seems clear that the strong weight of well-informed professional opinion took the obligation to defer to precedent seriously but
54
did not treat it as an absolute.
One of the most important early American commentators on the
law, Chancellor Kent, provides an excellent illustration of this
approach:
A solemn decision upon a point of law, arising in any given case,
becomes an authority in a like case, because it is the highest evidence
which we can have of the law applicable to the subject, and the
judges are bound to follow that decision so long as it stands unre-

versed, unless it can be shown that the law was misunderstood or
misapplied in that particular case. If a decision has been made
upon solemn argument and mature deliberation, the presumption is
in favor of its correctness.... When a rule has been once deliberately
adopted and declared, it ought not to be disturbed, unless by a
court of appeal or review, and never by the same court, except for very
cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error .... 55

Like Blackstone, Kent deemed precedents as a class to be strong
evidence of law, but left judges with a residual power to assess their
evidentiary worth and reject those found wanting. Much like a fact
witness, a precedent can be impeached as unreliable, for, to be entitled to a presumption of correctness, it must be the product of "solemn argument and mature deliberation"-points which are often ripe
for dispute. Also,just as one can reject fact testimony which makes no
sense, so courts may reject even those rules which have been "deliberately adopted and declared" if they have "very cogent reasons" for doing so "and upon a clear manifestation of error.""
54

See Lee, supra note 19, at 683 (concluding similarly that "[t]he founding-era

compromise [with regard to precedential force] seems comparable to the modern
notion that only an egregious error justifies abandoning precedent").
55
1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *475-76 (O.W. Holmes, Jr.
ed., 14th ed. 1896) (emphases added).
56 1 id. Kent was very clear that, if a precedent was sufficiently bad, it was not
binding and should be corrected. He continued,
I wish not to be understood to press too strongly the doctrine of stare decisis,
when I recollect that there are more than one thousand cases to be pointed
out in the English and American books of reports, which have been overruled, doubted, or limited in their application. It is probable that the
records of many of the courts in this country are replete with hasty and
crude decisions; and such cases ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance, rather than to have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty and harmony of the system destroyed by perpetuity of

error.
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William Cranch was an early reporter of Supreme Court cases
and therefore not exactly a disinterested observer of the importance
of precedent-he wanted to sell his books. That said, in the preface
of his first report, he wrote an apology which is entirely consistent with
the proposition that precedents are strong but rebuttable evidence of
law:
In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws,
the least possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the
judge. Whatever tends to render the laws certain, equally tends to
limit that discretion; and perhaps nothing conduces more to that
object than the publication of reports. Every case decided is a
check upon the judge. He cannot decide a similar case differently,
without strong reasons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to
57
make public.
In his 1791 Lectures on Law, James Wilson, a Framer of the first
rank and an Associate Justice of the first Supreme Court, condemned
"blind assent" to "authority," which he claimed should serve as a "skillful guide" to judges rather than "tyrannize" them. 581 The general
tenor of his remarks suggests, however, that he did not contemplate
that judges would lightly overrule the "skillful guide [s]" of precedent:
In certain sciences, a peculiar degree of regard should be paid to
authority. The common law is one of those sciences. Judicial decisions are the principaland most authentic evidence, which can be given,
of the existence of such a custom as is entitled to form a part of the
common law. Those who gave such decisions, were selected for that
employment, on account of their learning and experience in the
common law. As to the parties, and those whorepresent the parties
to them, their judgments continue themselves to be effective laws,
while they are unreversed. They should, in the cases of others, be
59
considered as strong evidence of law.
In his treatise, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut,
Zephaniah Swift, an early Chief Justice of Connecticut, advised,
We have introduced the English practice with respect to the authority of precedents. Courts are not at liberty to depart from prior decisions, in similar cases, unless they are repugnant to reason. It is
I id. at *477. This statement is, of course, completely consistent with declaratorytheory orthodoxy.
57 Preface to REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES,

IN AUGUST

AND DECEMBER TERMS,

1801,

AND

FEBRUARY TERM,

1803, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) iii, iii (New York, C. Wiley 1812) (1804) (emphasis added).

58

2JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS Or JAMES WILSON

Chicago, Callaghan and Company 1896).
59 2 id. at 160-61 (emphases added).

160 (James DeWitt Andrews ed.,
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therefore a common practice, when any dispute arises respecting a
point of law, to refer to precedents.0
In addition to rejecting precedents that are "repugnant to reason," he
also stated more generally that "[i]f a determination has been
founded upon mistaken principles, or the rule adopted by it be inconvenient, or repugnant to the general tenor of the law, a subsequent
6 1
court assumes the power to vary from or contradict it."1
As always,
the challenge presented by such language is to determine the degree
to which such vague standards for overruling a precedent swallow the
ostensible general rule of deference. Contrasting Swift's regard for
the force of English and Connecticut precedents is illuminating in
this regard. He discussed with approval the case of Wiford v. Grant, in
which the Supreme Court of Connecticut rejected an English rule forbidding reversal of a judgment with regard to some but not all defendants. 12 The court concluded that this rule made no sense where
partial reversal would not prejudice any rights of those defendants not
granted relief." 4 In light of this conclusion, the court deemed itself
free to reject the English rule because, as it explained,
[I]t doth not appear that this rule has been adopted in practice
here, so as to become authoritative. The common law of England we
are to pay great deference to, as being a general system of improved
reason, and a source from whence our principles of jurisprudence
have been mostly drawn: The rules, however, which have not been
made our own by adoption, we are to examine, and so far vary from
them as they may appear contrary to reason or unadapted to our
local circumstances, the policy of our law, or simplicity of our practice

....

64

Distinguishing the force of English precedents makes considerable
sense if one starts, as the Wilford court seemed to do, with the premises that the common law is rooted in custom and practice and that
these vary between Connecticut and England; on this view, one would
not necessarily expect English courts to give authoritative statements
concerning Connecticut custom and law, especially after a revolution.
In keeping with this logic, although English precedents were worthy
of "great deference," a Connecticut court could reject them on a certain showing of inconvenience or irrationality. By implicit contrast,
however, the court indicated that some stronger showing of error
60
(Arno
61
62
63
64

1 ZEPHANIAH Swi-rr, A SYSTEM OF THEIF LAWS OF TlE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 45
Press, photo. reprint 1972) (1795) (emphasis added).
1 id. at 41.
1 id. at 47 (citing Wilford v. Grant, 1 Kirby 114 (Conn. 1786)).
Wi/ford, 1 Kirby at 116-17.
Id. (emphases added).
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out a rule after it had been enwould be required to justify throwing
5
shrined in Connecticut precedent.1
In a similar vein, although some have charged thatJohn Marshall
did not care much for the doctrine of precedent, Professor Thomas
Lee's careful and recent reading of the Marshall Court's opinions
finds evidence for the proposition that it, too, adopted the mainstream view that precedents should be followed absent a substantial
justification to the contrary. 66 In addition, as will be explored in more
detail below, such luminaries of the ratification debates as Madison,
Hamilton, and the great Anti-Federalist Brutus67all seem to have subscribed to something like this same approach.
Of course, this brief tour of authorities cannot establish that all
jurists from at or around the time of the founding held identical views
regarding the generic force of precedents taken as a class. 68 Indeed,
even if we were to indulge the counterfactual that every lawyer and
judge from that time were on record as subscribing to the letter of
Blackstone's doctrine, one could not prove this point, for one cannot
expect uniformity with regard to qualitative, contextual judgments regarding what it means for a precedent to be "reasonable," "flatly absurd," and so on.
65 A similar dynamic may be found in the writings of Nathaniel. Chipman, a chief
justice of the Vermont Supreme Court. He decried that the precedents of the coinmon law of England had "been held in too great veneration." NATHANIEL CHIPMAN,
REPORTS AND DISSERTATIONS IN Two PARTS, PART II: DISSERTATIONS ON THE STATUTE
ADOPTING THE COMMON LAW OF ENGL\ND, THE STATUTE OF CONVEYANCES,

THE STAT-

123 (Printed by Anthony Haswell for the author, Vt., Rutland 1793). With regard to the problem of determining
whether to receive an English common law rule into Vermont law, he wrote,
If no reason can be assigned, in support of rules, or precedents, not already
adopted in practice, to adopt such rules, is certainly contrary to the principles
of our government, and the spirit of our laws, which admit not of arbitrary
rules, or of arbitrary decisions, even in matters indifferent.
Id. at 128 (emphasis added). Thus, at least with regard to English precedents, Chipman rejected Blackstone's dictum that the rationality of precedents should be presumed even where no supporting rationale for them could be discerned; implicitly,
however, this passage criticizing precedential dogmatism seems to grant that precedents that Vermont had "adopted in practice" should enjoy some sort of presumptive
force.
66 Lee, supra note 19, at 679-81 (concluding that the only "true overruling decisions" from the Marshall Court suggest it required more than simple disagreement to
justify rejecting a precedent).
67 See infra Part l.B.1.
68 Cf CHIPMAN, supra note 65, at 123 (condemning the "too great veneration"
granted to precedents).
UTE OF OFFSETS, AND ON THE NEGOTIABILITY OF NOTES
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Also, it should be noted that one can find opinions from that
time declaring that courts should not follow erroneous precedents."91
Such judicial statements must be read with care and do not necessarily
prove that their authors rejected the view that precedents should enjoy the presumptive force described in the prominent treatises of their
day. 71 Certainly, they are incompatible with the doctrine of strict precedent-which did not come into vogue until well into the nineteenth
century.7' They can, however, often be squared with the declaratory
theory's understanding of precedents as evidence of law-an approach that permits a court to overrule a "wrong" precedent provided
it first discharges its burden of overcoming the presumption that it
should be followed (by demonstrating, for example, that it was very
72
badly reasoned, no longer suits the times, etc.).
69 See, for example, Kerlin's Lessee v. Bull, 1 DalI. 175 (Pa. 1786), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed,
A court is not bound to give the like judgment, which had been given by a
former court, unless they are of opinion that the first judgment was according
to law; for any court may err; and if ajudge conceives, that judgment given
by a former court is erroneous, he ought not in conscience to give the like
judgment, he being sworn to judge according to law.
Id. at 178 (emphases added) (citation omitted); cf Healy, supra note 34, at 78 (rejecting the claim that stare decisis has constitutional import, and collecting cases from
at or near the founding in which courts overruled precedents).
70 Kerlins Lessee aptly demonstrates this point and provides a neat opportunity to
demonstrate how modern legal conceptions of precedent can color one's reading of
old cases. See Kerlin's Lessee, I DalI. at 175. As noted above, see supra note 69, in
Kerlin's Lessee the Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed that courts should not follow
"erroneous" precedents. One author recently has cited this passage as evidence for
the proposition that precedents enjoyed little force in post-revolutionary America. See
Healy, supra note 34, at 78-79. In Kerlin's Lessee, however, the court rejected an invitation to overrule a precedent because the statutory interpretation at issue had "been
*

.

. long accepted .

.

. as a rule of property" and, in such a situation, it was "but

reasonable [the court] should acquiesce and determine the same way, in so doubtful
a case." Kerlin's Lessee, I DalI. at 179. Professor Caleb Nelson has recently relied on
this latter aspect of Kerlins Lessee as evidence that courts would defer to reasonable
precedents in a Chevron-like fashion. Nelson, supra note 6, at 16. Perhaps these two
readings only differ with regard to whether they treat the precedent cup as half-full or
half-empty. Healy finds significance in the court's rejection of a strict theory of precedent; Nelson is more impressed by the court's adherence to a medium-weight, Chevron-like form (which is perfectly consistent with declaratory theory). Whatever else
may be said about this case, it does not demonstrate that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court of 1786 thought that precedents did not matter.
71 On the late arrival of "strict" precedent, see Hart v. Massanari,266 F.3d 1155,
1164-65, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001); and 1 PLUCKNETr, supra note 34, at 349-50.
72 For an example of this dynamic, see Cunningham v. Morrell, 10 Johns. 203,
205-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813), in which Chancellor Kent explained at length that two of
his own court's precedents had to be overruled because they (and the English prece-

20031

HORIZONTAL

FORCE OF PRECEDENT

1095

In any event, one need not document absolute unanimity regarding the doctrine of precedent among all jurists scattered across the
(ex-)colonies to demonstrate the obvious: precedents mattered in the
common-law jurisprudence of the time of the founding. It was largely
common ground that they should serve as a meaningful check on judicial discretion-a judge had a legal obligation to follow an on-point
precedent within his jurisdiction unless he could produce a good legal
reason not to do so. To be sure, this check was (and remains) fuzzy
on the margins because, inter alia: (1) determining whether sufficient
justification exists for overruling requires qualitative judgments of a
sort that tend to provoke disagreement; and (2) judges of differing
temperaments no doubt have always tended to differ with regard to
how strong a presumption they believe should protect precedents as a
class. Just because a constraint is fuzzy, however, does not make it
73
unimportant or meaningless.
B.

The Expected Interaction of Declaratory-Theory Stare Decisis with the
New Constitution
In Anastasoff v. United States, Judge Arnold of the Eighth Circuit

held that the declaratory view of precedential force was so deeply ingrained in the Framers' understanding of the proper operation of the
courts and separation of powers that this norm must inhere in the
definition of Article III's 'judicial power." 74 As discussed below, this
contention is likely incorrect. Nonetheless, it is undeniably true that
prominent Federalist and Anti-Federalist writers expected the new
federal courts to conduct their business of construing the law, including the Constitution, subject to the strictures of the declaratory theory-precedents over time would create "evidence" of law that would
tend to "liquidate" constitutional meaning and help block courts from
exercising "arbitrary discretion. 7'1 5 It also seems plain that, had anydent on which they relied) misapplied the principles expressed by still earlier precedents and that they would, if followed, lead to "evil consequences." But see Healy,
supra note 34, at 81 (citing Cunningham, among other cases, as evidence that courts in
the post-revolutionary period felt relatively free to depart from precedents).
73 It strikes me as rather unlikely that someone firmly committed to the view that
precedents are too fuzzy to matter at all would have made it to this footnote. That
said, for indications that stare decisis influences outcomes even at the Supreme Court,
see supra notes 20 and 29.
74 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054
(8th Cir. 2000).
75 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000) (discussing role of precedent as "liquidator" of meaning); THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) (stating that adherence
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one thought to level the charge, the Framers would have rejected out
of hand the claim that the courts could defeat this expectation by
abandoning this norm of their own volition. They likely would not
have done so, however, because of a belief that the definition of the
'judicial power" per se demands adherence to any given doctrine of
stare decisis. Rather, they would have proceeded from a basic norm
of the day rooted in both contemporaneous common-law jurisprudence and separation-of-powers theory: judges are law-"finders," not
lawmakers, and they lack the authority to change the law in ways that
7
increase their own power. "
1. Precedent as a "Liquidator" of Constitutional Meaning and a
Limit on Judicial Discretion
The remarks from the time of the ratification debates of the great
pamphleteers Hamilton, Madison, Brutus, and the Federal Farmer indicate that they all expected the new federal courts to adhere to something like the declaratory theory's doctrine of precedent. It is worth
noting that they treated the correctness of this expectation as a
given-they did not expressly defend or attack the proposition that
courts should show deference to their earlier decisions. Rather, their
brief discussions of the subject discuss what they sawas the positive or
negative effects of accumulating federal court precedents. Missing
from these discussions is anything approaching a full-blown analysis
suggesting that the Constitution of its own force commands obedience to any given doctrine of stare decisis.
The Federalist No. 78 provides what must be the most frequently
cited discussion by a Framer of the expected role of precedent in the
federal courts. On inspection, it is a very slender reed upon which to
attempt to build a constitutional doctrine. 77 In it, Hamilton defended
life tenure for judges with the following argument:
It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid an
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should
be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and

point out their duty in every particular case that come before them;
and it will readily be conceived from the variety of controversies
to precedent prevents courts from exercising "arbitrary discretion"). See generally infra
Part l.B.1.
76 See generally infra Part I.B.3.
77 Cf. Lee, supra note 19, at 663 (describing Hamilton's discussioI of precedent
in The Federalist No. 78 as a "side-bar").
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which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the
records of those precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and laborious study to acquire
7
a competent knowledge of them. 8
In reading this brief passage, one should probably bear in mind that
Hamilton had an incentive to magnify the importance of precedents-the more important they are, the more. important it is to give
judges lots of time to learn them all. Be that as it may, it does provide
evidence that he anticipated that precedents would play an important
role in limiting judicial discretion in the post-ratification legal world.
Avoiding an "arbitrary discretion" in the courts would require that
they be "bound down" by "precedents" (as well as "rules") in sufficient
number that their "records" would "swell to a very considerable
bulk."79 One must be careful, however, to avoid reading the phrase
"bound down" anachronistically. It does not represent a commitment
to a theory of precedent as strictly binding law of the sort that came
into favor in nineteenth-century England and that governs vertical relationships among American courts now. 811 Rather, it seems overwhelmingly likely that Hamilton regarded precedents as "binding" in
the limited declaratory-theory sense-that is, a precedent is evidence
of law that "binds" a court unless it is rebutted by cogent legal analysis
explaining why the precedent is wrong."'
Both the Madison and Hamilton halves of Publius provided evidence that they expected this approach to precedent to shape the federal courts' construction of the Constitution by sounding the theme
that time would clarify its meaning. In The FederalistNo. 82, Hamilton
wrote,
The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may
distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of intricacy
78 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 502-03 (emphases added).
79 Id.
80 Cf. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1168 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The modern concept of binding precedent-where a single opinion sets the course on a particular
point of law and must be followed by courts at the same level and lower within a
pyramidal judicial hierarchy-came about only gradually over the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries."); 1 PLUC;KNEI-r',
supra note 34, at 350 (noting that "the
nineteenth century produced the changes which were necessary for the establishment
of the rigid theory [of precedent]").
81 See Lee, supra note 19, at 663 ("But Federalist No. 78was hardly conceived as a
comprehensive exposition of stare decisis, and Hamilton's statement of a prima facie
rule of adherence to precedent should not be construed to exclude the existence of
exceptions or countervailing considerations."); Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1572-76
(setting forth a series of arguments explaining why The FederalistNo. 78should not be
"overread" to state a "strict rule of stare decisis").
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and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be expected to
flow from the establishment of a constitution founded upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties.
Time only can mature and perfect so compound a system, liquidate
the meaning of all the parts, and adjust them to each other in a harmo82
nious and consistent whole.
"Time," in itself, can do nothing to clarify the fuzzy parts of the
Constitution, but the passage of time does create opportunities for
decisionmakers to interpret them. Such interpretations (read: "precedents") cannot offer clarification and "liquidation," however, if they
merely inform later decisionmakers what earlier ones have said. Indeed, if precedents merely illustrate interpretive options, one should
expect them to highlight, rather than minimize, the problem of indeterminacy as their number builds and various courts hand down contradictory interpretations of law. Therefore, Hamilton's it-takes-time
approach to constitutional interpretation implicitly requires that
precedents exercise some measure of coercive force.
Madison-Publius provided more direct evidence for this point. As
part of a defense of the proposed division between state and federal
power, he made an argument for reasonable expectations-given the
difficulty of the problem and the limits of language, one should not
expect immediate perfection:
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and
passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered
as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications.M

Madison steered the expected middle road in this passage regarding
precedential force. Precedents must be more than merely persuasive
because, if they possess no presumptive force at all, they cannot "liquidate and ascertain" the meaning of indeterminate text. On the other
hand, consistent with declaratory jurisprudence, a single decision by
itself is not strictly binding law. Madison instead indicated that a "series" of "particular discussions and adjudications" would be necessary
to fix constitutional meaning. If a precedent is just evidence of law
rather than law itself, then a "series" of opinions adopting the same
legal analysis should enjoy more force than just one opinion-just as
identical testimony from fifty witnesses is generally better than testimony from just one. Following this same logic, a substantial enough
82 Ti-E FEDEURALST No. 82, at 525-26 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano
ed., 2000) (emphasis added).
83

THE FinDERALIST No. 37, sup/ra note 75, at 226 (emphasis added).
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series of precedents could make an overwhelming case for a given interpretation of law and thereby fix its meaning. Read in this light,
Madison-Publius in The Federalist No. 37 is reassuring his readers that
this same process would eventually settle the meaning of the
Constitution.
Albeit long after the ratification debates, Madison confirmed this
reading in the letters he wrote defending his change in position on
the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States. 4 He explained
that his personal judgment had been trumped by the overwhelming
force of accumulating precedents, which "when formed on due discussion and consideration, and deliberately sanctioned by reviews and
repetitions," have "authoritative force in settling the meaning of a
law"-including constitutional law.85- He also admitted, however, that
"cases which transcend all authority of precedents must be admitted,
but they form exceptions which will speak for themselves and must
justify themselves."8 6 Thus, like Blackstone and Kent, Madison believed that some sort of "special justification" (to use again the Supreme Court's modern phrase) beyond mere disagreement is
necessary to justify rejecting a precedent.
The most prominent Anti-Federalist writers likewise expected
that precedents would fix constitutional interpretations. Brutus, one
of the most significant and articulate of Publius's foes,8 7 penned a series of letters criticizing the proposed federal judiciary which were
published in the New York Journalfrom late January through March of
1788.88 These letters appeared after the January 11, 1788 publication
of The FederalistNo. 37, in which Madison-Publius had admitted that
84

See Letter from James Madison to CharlesJared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in

THE

MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL TiOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON

390 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) [hereinafter MIND

OF THE FOUNDER];

from James Madison to C.E. Haynes (Feb. 25, 1831), in 9

Letter

THE WRITINGS OF JAMES

443 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1910) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON];
Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist, sup/ra note 1, in 4 LETERS AND OTHER WRIINGS, supra note 1, at 211.
MADISON

85

Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll, supra note 84, in MINI)
supra note 84, at 391.
Letter from James Madison to C.E. Haynes, supra note 84, in 9 WRITINGS OF

OF THE FOUNDER,

86

supra note 84, at 443.
87 Brutus "provides an extended and excellent discussion-the best in the AntiFederalist literature-of the judiciary to be established tinder the Constitution and its
far-reaching implications," and his essays, which appeared in the New York Journalbetween October 1787 and April 1788, "are the most direct Anti-Federal confrontation
of the arguments of the The Federalist." Herbert J. Storing, Introduction to Essays of
Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
88 See 2 TIHE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358-446 (HerbertJ. Storing ed., 1981)
(collecting the Brutus letters and specifying their publication dates).
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the Constitution's federalism provisions were vague and that time and
precedents would be needed to "liquidate and ascertain" their meaning.8*- With this opening, Brutus might have argued that no such "liquidation" could be expected because the Constitution did not
expressly command the courts to follow precedents and they were
therefore free to ignore them. For reasons explored below, he did
not make this argument. Instead, he wrote that that the proposed
Supreme Court would need to "assume certain principles, from which
they will reason" to interpret the Constitution, and that these "principles, whatever they may be, [would] become fixed, by a course of decisions."9 1 In other words, he shared Madison's basic understanding of
the shaping effect of precedents on the law, including the
Constitution.
The Federal Farmer, another Anti-Federalist of the first rank, -' l
also thought that precedents would exercise some measure of coercive
force in the proposed federal courts-indeed, his chief worry in this
regard was that, as of the time of ratification, there would not be
enough precedents to limit the Supreme Court's equitable powers:
It is a very dangerous thing to vest in the same judge power to decide on the law, and also general powers in equity, for if the law
restrain him, he is only to step into his shoes of equity, and give
what judgment his reason or opinion may dictate; we have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions in equity as in
Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many
2
years will be mere discretion.9

The Federal Farmer did not intend in this passage to give a general
explanation of his understanding of the force of precedents any more
than Hamilton did in The FederalistNo. 78. Nonetheless, it is plain that
he agreed with Hamilton that precedents are necessary to limit judicial discretion and forestall arbitrary power concentrating in the
courts.

89

TIlE FEDERAuLST No. 37, supra note 75, at 221.

90 Letter of Brutus No. XII (Feb. 7, 1788), in 2 TiE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
snpra note 88, at 423.
91 "The Observations of The Federal Farmer are generally, and correctly, considered to be one of the ablest Anti-Federalist pieces ...." HerbertJ. Storing, Introduction to Observations Leading to a lair Examination of the System fGovernment Proposed by the
Late Convention; And to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in Itin a Number of
Letters firom the Federal Fanner to the Repnblican, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,

supra note 88, at 214.
92 Letter of tile Federal Farmler No. III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEI)"RALIST,

supra.note 88, at 244.
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In sum, the limited direct remarks on the subject of precedent of
these most prominent Federalists and Anti-Federalists show that they
adhered to a theory of precedent basically consistent with the major
common-law treatises of the day, and that they believed that the accumulating force of precedents would, over time, tend to authoritatively "fix" the meaning of the Constitution. One theme to be found
in their remarks is that adherence to precedent forestalls the accumulation of arbitrary power in the courts-which is also a primary function of separation of powers, of course. None of them, however,
makes any express argument that the Constitution requires adherence
to a given doctrine of precedent as a necessary means for attaining the
separation-of-powers end of constraining judicial discretion to acceptable levels.
2.

A Modern Overreading of the Framers and a Slightly Misplaced
Riposte: Anastasoff Meets Massanari

An interpreter determined to make an historical, original-intent
argument that declaratory-theory stare decisis is a necessary and integral part of the Article III 'judicial power" faces problems. The initial
embarrassment for this claim is that the Constitution contains no express instructions to this effect. Moreover, although the Framers
plainly understood the obvious point that precedent and separation
of powers both serve the function of constraining judicial discretion,
they did not elaborate in any detail on the nature of the relation between these doctrines. Perhaps the most natural response to these
points is to argue that they mistake the way background norms work.
The point of language is to communicate, and it is not worth the work
to communicate the incredibly obvious. The Constitution nowhere
says that the term "court" does not mean "tennis court" or "fish"; and
the ratification debates do not address these points, either. Nonetheless, we can safely take as given that everybody knows that "court" in the
Constitution bears neither of these meanings. On this view, given the
dominance of declaratory theory of precedent at the time of the
Framing, there was no point in discussing its relationship to the Constitution's 'judicial power." Everybody knew that the new Constitution would require the new federal courts to work in this traditional
framework.
Something like the. preceding reasoning seems to have motivated
the panel opinion in Anastasoff v. United States,93 in which Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit concluded that circuit court rules
93

SeeAnastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on

reh' en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
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authorizing issuance of "nonprecedents" are unconstitutional because
the Constitution's definition of the 'judicial power" requires courts to
defer to their own precedents along the lines once demanded by the
common law's declaratory theory. -4 The most glaring problem with
this particular attempt to find a separation-of-powers home for the
doctrine of precedent is that it posits that the Framers silently adopted
a definition of 'judicial power" different from Blackstone's. It seems
safe to hazard that a proposition concerning the nature of the judicial
power could not at once be so obvious as to warrant no discussion and
contradict what largely amounted to a legal bible for the common-law
world.
On April 13, 1996, Faye Anastasoff had mailed a refund claim to
the IRS to recover an overpayment of taxes paid on April 15, 1993."1

The claim arrived and was filed at the agency on April 16, 1996which was, alas, three years and one day after the overpayment. 9 6 The
IRS denied the refund claim on the authority of 26 U.S.C. § 6511(b),
which imposes a three-year cutoff. - 7 Anastasoff attempted to invoke

the "Mailbox Rule" of § 7502, which, if applicable, would have
deemed her refund claim to have been (timely) filed when mailed.98
Unfortunately for her, an Eighth Circuit panel had rejected precisely
this same argument four years before in the unpublished Christie v.
United States."" Anastasoff gamely contended that Christie was not
binding because it was an unpublished decision, and, under Eighth
Circuit Rule 28(A)(i), "[u]npublished opinions are not precedent"
and may exercise no more than "persuasive" force.""' Judge Arnold
rejected this attempt to get around Christie on the ground that the
rule's purported elimination of precedential force of unpublished
opinions was "unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports
94
id. at 900.
95 Id. at 899.
96 /d.
97 /d.
98 Id.
99 Id. (citing Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis
38446 (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992) (per curiam)).
100 Rule 28(A)(i) provides,
Unpublished opinions are not precedent and parties generally should not
cite them. When relevant to establishing the doctrities of resjudicata, collat-

eral estoppel, or the law of the case, however, the parties may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an unpublished opinion of this
court if the opinion has persuasive value on a material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve as well ....
8th Cir. R. 28(A)(i).
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to confer on the federal courts a power that goes beyond the
'judicial.' ",01

Judge Arnold rooted this claim in what he characterized as the
historical understanding of the nature of the judicial power and separation-of-powers theory. He observed that by the time of the framing,
"the doctrine of precedent was not merely well-established; it was the
historic method of judicial decisionmaking, and well regarded as a
12
bulwark of judicial independence in past struggles for liberty."'
Leaning heavily on Blackstone, Coke, and Hale, he also invoked the
declaratory-theory principle that "[t]hejudicial power is a power only
to determine what the law is, not to invent it."' H : As precedents are,
on this view, the "best and most authoritative" evidence of law, judges
must follow them. 11 4 In addition, he relied on Blackstone, Hamilton,
and Madison to support the separation-of-powers proposition thatjudicial obedience to precedent is necessary to ensure that judges do
not transform themselves into legislators exercising "will" rather than
legal 'judgment."

115

Judge Arnold was careful to emphasize that the court was not
"creating some rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents."",,
In keeping with a correct understanding how the declaratory theory
functioned, he wrote,
Cases can be overruled. Sometimes they should be. On our Court,
this function can be performed by the en banc Court, but not by a
single panel. If the reasoning of a case is exposed as faulty, or if
other exigent circumstances justify it, precedents can be changed.
When this occurs, however, there is a burden of justification. The

precedent from which we are departing should be stated, and our
reasons for rejecting it should be made convincingly clear. In this
way, the law grows and changes, but it does so incrementally, in response to the dictates of reason, and not becausejudges have simply

changed their minds. 117
The panel opinion in Anastasoffenjoyed only short life as a precedent itself, as the en banc court later vacated it as moot after the IRS
and Anastasoff settled their differences."' It nonetheless sparked a
101
102
103
104

Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 899.
Id. at 900.
Id. at 901.
Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *69-71).

105
106
107

Id. at 901-02.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 904-05.

108

Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacating

as moot 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000).
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minor firestorm over the propriety of circuit court rules authorizing
issuance of "nonprecedents.""''9
The most thorough judicial riposte came from Judge Kozinski of
the Ninth Circuit, who, in the lengthy and learned Hart v. Massanari,'II" contended that such rules were a constitutional and pragmatic "effort to deal with precedent in the context of a modern legal
system."''' As a threshold matter, he observed that it is unclear what,
if any, constitutional foundation underlies many of the historical practices of the federal courts, which have evolved considerably over the
course of the last two-hundred-some years.' 12 For example, in situations where judges once issued seriatim opinions that spoke only for
their authors, they now commonly write opinions on behalf of their
courts; no one claims this change in practice violates the Constitution.I 13 In short, the definition of the 'judicial power" does not compel the courts to continue a practicejust because it was in place a long
time ago.
Much of the opinion's energy then focused on establishing that
the Framers could not possibly have adhered to a strict doctrine of
"binding" precedent given that, inter alia: (1) the declaratory theory
of precedent which prevailed at the time merely gave "evidentiary"
rather than "binding" weight to precedents;' 14 (2) "strict binding precedent" cannot properly function in the absence of a distinct hierarchy of courts, which did not exist at common law;' 15 (3) reporting of
cases was biased and sketchy at best, which forced lawyers and judges
to rely more on commentaries (such as Blackstone's) than actual judicial opinions; I " and (4) a doctrine of strict precedent contradicts the
tenor of the common law, which, "at its core, was a reflection of custom," which has "built-in flexibility . . . to change with circum109 For a sampling of commentary on the Anastasoff panel opinion, see supra note
18.
110 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
111 Id. at 1160.
112 Id. at 1160-62.
113 See id. According to Judge Kozinski, federal court "traditions" lacking obvious
constitutional foundations include "the practices of issuing written opinions that
speak for the court rather than for individual judges, adherence to the adversarial
(rather than inquisitorial) model of developing cases, limits on the exercise of equitable relief, hearing appeals with panels of three or more judges and countless others
that are so much a part of the way we do business that few would think to question
them." Id. at 1160-61.
114 Id. at 1163-64.
115 Id. at 1164.
116 Id. at 1165-66.
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stance." 11 7 In light of these and related points, Judge Kozinski
concluded that the Framers would have found strict precedent in the
modern sense quite alien and certainly did not bury it in the Article
III "judicial power."' 18
Judge Kozinski's historical and constitutional analysis is forceful
and persuasive. For the most part, however, it does not speak directly
to the precise Anastasoff thesis, for, again, Judge Arnold was careful to
stress that he did not claim that the Constitution imposes a strict,
"rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents," and he understood that any such approach would contradict the Framers' declaratory-theory jurisprudence.' 19 Rather, the actual constitutional claim
of Anastasoff is that courts must treat their own precedents as serious
1 2
"evidence" of law and that this demand is far from trivial. 0
The real problem with the actual Anastasoff thesis is that, even if
one assumes that the Framers' rather inchoate expectations regarding
the meaning of the 'judicial power" should control modern interpretation, it is unlikely that they understood this generic phrase to entail
adherence to the common-law doctrine of precedent.12 ' The immensely influential Blackstone made plain both that the "original
power of judicature" resided in all nations, and that not all nations'
12 2
judicial systems relied on the common-law doctrine of precedent.
His discussion of this doctrine focused on its role in enabling the English courts to solve their specific interpretive problem of discerning
the contours of the unwritten, common law of England-the lex non

117 Id.at 1167.
118 See id. at 1174-76.
119 Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 904 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on
reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
120 Id. at 901-03.
121 See Harrison, supra note 18, at 522-23 (noting the absence of evidence "that an
American lawyer around the time of the Framing would have asserted that civil law
tribunals, which did not have the common law doctrine of precedent, were exercising
something other than the judicial power").
122 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *266-67. Blackstone wrote,
The original power ofjudicature, by the fundamental principles of society, is
lodged in the society at large: but as it would be impracticable to render
complete justice to every individual by the people in their collective capacity,
therefore every nation has committed that power to certain select magistrates,
who with more ease and expedition can hear and determine complaints ....
1 id. (emphasis added); see also Harrison, supra note 18, at 522-23 nn.61-63 (noting
instances in which Blackstone and Hamilton used the phrase "judicial power" (or
'judex" or "power of judicature") to describe authority present in all governments).
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scripta.12 1 The judicial problem of figuring out the fine details of the
law is not, however, unique to common law. Blackstone observed that,
in civil-law Rome, if a statute's meaning was unclear, it would be referred to the emperor, who would issue a rescript interpreting the law
that would be binding on the courts.124 Blackstone compared the role
of rescripts in the Roman civil law with that of judicial decisions in the
common law:
Upon the whole .

. . ,

we may take it as a general rule, "that the

decisions of the courts of justice are the evidence of what is common law:" in the same manner as, in the civil law, what the emperor
25
had once determined was to serve for a guide for the future.'
Given the ready availability in the dominant treatise of the day of such
information regarding alternative ways for judicial systems to create
and refine definitive interpretations of law, merely inserting the unexplained phrase 'judicial power" into Article III would have been a singularly bad way for the Framers to impose a constitutional obligation
on the federal courts to adhere to the common-law doctrine of
precedent. 12i
Of course, one might counter that Blackstone's discussions of the
civil law are of little import because the peculiar meaning of the 'judicial power" in the American scene must be understood in light of the
Framers' obsession with a particular form of separation of powers, and
that it is this doctrine-rather than the abstract definition of 'judicial
power"-which compels the conclusion that the Constitution commands the courts to respect precedent to prevent them from usurping
arbitrary, legislative power. Indeed, this argument is a central thrust
of Anastasoff' ' 7 which invokes Hamilton's dictum in The FederalistNo.
78, that "[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable they be bound down by strict rules and precedent ....

,,s

123 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *69. Interestingly enough, Blackstone's discussion of methods of statutory interpretation (i.e., figuring out the lex scripta) does not
refer to the doctrine of precedent. See I id. at *87-93.
124 1 id. at *58-59.
125 1 id. at *71 (citation omitted).
126 On Blackstone's influence, see supra note 43. For further evidence of cognizance in the early Republic of the fact that not all judicial systems followed the English model, see also 1 SwiFr, supra note 60, at 45 (noting that Connecticut had
"introduced the English practice with respect to the authority of precedents," which
suggests awareness of the existence of non-English practices).
127 Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on
reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
128 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 502-03.
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This argument, however, boils down to a restatement of the claim
that the Framers' understanding of separation of powers entailed adherence to the common-law doctrine of precedent. As discussed in
the preceding subsection, the limited discussions from the time of the
ratification debates of the relation of precedent to the Constitution's
separation of powers are actually quite sketchy and do not demonstrate so strong a connection. Certainly it is true that luminaries on
both sides expected precedential force to limit the discretion of the
courts, and that this is also an acknowledged end of separation of powers. It is far from obvious, however, that the Constitution requires the
courts to adhere to the declaratory theory of precedent as a necessary
means for attaining this separation-of-powers end.12 9 One cannot justify jamming stare decisis into the definition of the Article III 'judicial
power" merely by noting that the Framers were aware that both it and
separation of powers share common goals at some level of abstraction.
3.

A More Modest Original "Intent": The Framers Expected Courts
To Find, Not Rewrite, Their Rules of Interpretation

Although the Anastasoff attempt to find a home for the declaratory theory's doctrine of precedent in the definition of Article III's
'judicial power" fails, it does not follow that the Framers believed that
this doctrine had no separation-of-powers import or that the federal
courts would be free to abandon this doctrine at will. According to
both the common-law and separation-of-powers dogmas of the day,
courts were to "find" laws rather than legislate new ones. In light of
this principle, the Framers would have found the notion that courts
could rewrite legal interpretive norms to suit themselves quite alien,
and, in this same vein, would have rejected out of hand the notion
that courts could rewrite established law to release themselves from
the constraints of stare decisis. In other words, from the point of view
of the Framers, although the Constitution did not directly command
the courts to adhere to a given doctrine of precedent, it did command
them to apply rather than rewrite law-including the law of
precedent.
129 Cf Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We believe that
Anastasoff overstates the case. Rules that empower courts of appeals to issue nonprecedential decisions do not cut those courts free from all legal rules and precedents; if they did, we might find cause for alarm."); Harrison, suprra note 18, at 524
(criticizing Anastasoff on the ground that one cannot properly infer that the definition of Article III's 'judicial power" imposes stare decisis on the courts merely from
the fact that respect for precedent tends to prevent courts from exercising legislative

power).
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Indirect evidence for this proposition can be found by exploring
the debate between Anti-Federalists and Federalists over whether the
new Constitution granted the new federal courts too much interpretive discretion. One of Brutus's key arguments was that the courts
would use their power to resolve cases in "equity" to justify interpreting the Constitution in light of its "spirit" to grab power from the
states. ' At first glance, the Constitution's silence regarding precedent would seem to have created another golden opportunity for Brutus to magnify fears of an unrestrained federal judiciary. He could
have argued that even Publius admits that the Constitution will remain "obscure and equivocal" until its meaning has been "liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications."' " The Constitution, however, does not command the new federal courts to respect precedents; therefore, these courts, as they
follow the natural tendency of all officials to maximize their power,
will refuse to be bound by them. Given his deep concern that the
Constitution would be too malleable in the hands of the judiciary, why
didn't Brutus seize this opening? One likely answer is that, like his
Federalist opponents, he did not believe that the courts would be at
liberty to change preexisting rules of legal interpretation (which
would include the doctrine of precedent) in ways that would fundamentally increase their power.
The hypothetical charge that courts would abandon respect for
precedent is similar to the "equity" argument Brutus did make in the
sense that both can lead to the conclusion that the federal courts
would possess an unacceptable power to "interpret" the Constitution
any way they liked. They are different in an important and illuminating respect, however. Brutus's actual argument relied not on constitutional silence but on an affirmative grant of power to the federal
courts to determine cases arising in "equity."' 13 2 The courts would not
130 Letter of Brutus No. X1 (Jan. 31, 1788), in 2 THE

COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,

supra note 88, at 420. The Federal Farmer expressed similar worries. See Letter of the
Federal Farmer No. XV (Jan. 18, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 88, at 322 (concluding that grant of equity authority to the Supreme Court
seemed to give it power to go beyond the "spirit and true meaning" of the
Constitution).
131 THE FEDERALISr No. 37, supra note 75, at 226; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing implications of The Federalist No. 37 for Madison's views of
precedent).
132 See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .....
(emphasis
added)).
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need to change the law to seize the power to interpret the Constitution equitably because the Constitution already granted it to them.
As Brutus characterized the matter, when wearing its law hat, the
Supreme Court would interpret "according to the rules laid down for
construing a law" 33-in other words, although no such rules were expressly written into the Constitution, Brutus accepted that the Court
would take certain common-law interpretive rules as given, which he
broadly described as follows,
These rules give a certain degree of latitude of explanation. According to this mode of construction, the courts are to give such
meaning to the constitution as comports best with the common,
and generally received acceptation of the words in which it is expressed, regarding their ordinary and popular use, rather than their
grammatical propriety. Where words are dubious, they will be explained by the context. The end of the clause will be attended to,
and the words will be understood, as having a view to it; and the
words will not be so understood as to bear no meaning or a very
1 34
absurd one.
But Brutus contended that when the Court wore its equitable hat,
it would be empowered "to explain the constitution according to the
reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter."' 13 5 To justify this claim, he seized on Blackstone's discussion of
equitable statutory construction, which describes a judicial power to
alleviate the consequences of strict adherence to the letter of the law
where such an approach would lead to harsh, unexpected consequences that the legislature itself would have wished to avoid had it
foreseen them. 13 6 He voiced the concern that this power to depart
from the Constitution could never be effectively controlled because
equity's application depends "essentially upon each individual case,
[so] there can be no established rules and fixed principles of equity
laid down, without destroying its very essence, and reducing it to posi37
tive law." 1
Brutus contended that the Supreme Court, freed from "fixed"
and "established rules" of legal construction by the equity wild card,
133

Letter of Brutus No. Xl, supra note 130, in 2 THE

COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,

supra note 88, at 419.
134 Id., in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 420. Brutus paraphrased Blackstone in this passage. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *59.
135 Letter of Brutus No. XI, supra note 130, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 88, at 419.
136 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note

137

5, at *61.
Letter of Brutus No. XI, supra note 130, in 2

T1E COMPLETE ANTI-FEDIERALIS'r,
supra note 88, at 420 (citing I BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at *61-62).
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would construe the "general and indefinite terms" of the Constitution
to the "entire subversion of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the individual states."' 13 8 Worse, once the judiciary's generous
constructions had become "fixed... by a course of decisions" (i.e., by
precedents), Congress would join the overreaching fun and use them
as a license to extend its own dominion as far as possible at state
expense. '19,
Note well that Brutus relied on accepted authority to justify his
claims concerning Court's equity power-that is, he invoked "law"
(broadly understood to include equity jurisprudence) to support the
contention that equity is lawless. That he did so suggests why he did
not make the more general argument that the federal courts would be
free to make up new interpretive principles that would transform the
Constitution into putty in their hands. Today, it is a commonplace
that courts "make" law. That was not the common-law jurisprudence
of two-hundred-some years ago, which ostensibly required courts to
"find" law. Under this theory, courts could not, willy-nilly, make up
new "laws" of legal interpretation out of whole cloth. Brutus therefore
did not level the charge that they would.
Much of The Federalist Nos. 78-83 may be understood as a response to Brutus's equitable-construction broadside. The core of
Hamilton's rebuttal was that the new federal courts would construe
the Constitution pursuant to traditional, stable principles; therefore,
the courts would not, in the name of "interpreting" the Constitution,
be able to distort it. 14 ' Two arguments in support of this thesis are of
particular interest. First, Hamilton argued that Brutus had misunderstood the nature of the "equity" power granted by the Constitution. 141
It was not a license to adopt a loose-cannon approach to constitutional interpretation. Instead, it was merely a grant of power to order
remedies that would have fallen within chancery jurisdiction. 142 Furthermore, Brutus exaggerated the flexibility of equity because, over
time, "the principles by which that relief is governed [had become]
reduced to a regular system"-that is, equity was controlled by precedents. 14 " Hamilton thus characterized the federal courts' equitable
138 Id., in 2 THE COMITEE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 88, at 420.
139 Letter of Brutus No. XIi (Feb. 7, 1788), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST,
supra note 88, at 423-24.
140 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 498-503.
141

See THE FEDERAuST No. 80, at 512-13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano

ed., 2000).
142 Id.
143

2000).

THE FEDERiuST

No. 83, at 540 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
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powers as merely amounting to a grant of jurisdiction over a supple-

mental body of stable "law" that was embodied in earlier judicial decisions. 14 4 It was not a license to make the Constitution meaningless.
Second, and even more to the present point, Hamilton minimized the threat of judicial mischief by minimizing the power of the
courts to manipulate interpretive norms. To start, he remarked that
"[i]n the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan which directly
empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the
spirit of the Constitution .... -145 The federal courts' interpretive
powers would be no different in kind than those claimed by any state
court.

1

46

What general principles, then, should guide all courts-federal
or state-as they interpret the Constitution? The answer, sprinkled
throughout The FederalistNos. 78 and 81-83, seems to be: courts must
interpret the Constitution in light of principles derived from "law,"
"nature," "reason," "truth," "propriety," and "common-sense"-none
of which courts are free to rewrite. For example, in The FederalistNo.
78, Hamilton described the source of the rule that, where statutes contradict, courts should enforce the last enacted:
[T]his is a mere rule of construction, not derived from any positive
law, but from the nature and reason of the thing. It is a rule not
enjoined upon the courts by legislative provision, but adopted by
themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the direction of
their conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it reasonable,
that between the interfering acts of equal authority, that which was
47
the last indication of its will should have the preference. 1
By contrast, when choosing whether to enforce a constitution or a

later-enacted and contradictory statute, "nature and reason" dictate
14
enforcement of the older but superior authority.
For Hamilton, the Constitution did not need to include interpretive instructions because it was evident that established, rational rules
144 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 141, at 512-13.
145 THE FEDERALisT No. 81, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed.,
2000). One cannot help but wonder how Hamilton would have fired back if Brutus
had responded, "Well, what about indirectly?"
146 Id.
147 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 499 (emphases added).
148 Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81, supra note 145, at 517 (observing that "general principles of law and reason" forbid legislatures from revising judicial sentences)
(emphases added); THE FEDERALISI No. 83, supra note 143, at 531-32 (stressing that
"[t]he rules of legal interpretation are rules of common-sense" that cannot be invoked
"contrary to reason").
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would guide its construction. 14: Courts cannot legislate new rules out
of whole cloth free from the constraints of "nature," "reason," and
"law"-for example, a court could not legitimately make up a new legal maxim that any clause with a capitalized noun in it encodes a secret message from the Framers to ignore that clause. To conclude
otherwise would necessarily imply that, although the Anti-Federalists'
equitable-construction argument was wrong because it mistook the nature of "equity," their conclusion that the new federal courts could
make the Constitution say anything they wanted was correct-in
which case there would have been no point in writing it down.
If Brutus had tried to argue that the Constitution's silence with
regard to precedent left courts free to abandon stare decisis, a similar
logic would have applied. The legal orthodoxy of the common-law
world was that courts must treat precedents as evidence of law that
should be followed absent countervailing evidence. Abandoning this
orthodoxy would have amounted to a fundamental change in the law
governing how courts perform their work.' 5 1 Hamilton would likely
149

See Ti.

FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 498-99.

150 For a set of illuminating arguments suggesting a contrary conclusion as well as
a strong critique of the Anastasoff opinion, see Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 18. Professor Lee and Mr. Lehnhof contend that the norms of stare decisis were in flux before,
during, and after the time of the founding and that nothing about the history of this
doctrine suggests that the Framers wished to "freeze" it into the Constitution. See id.
at 166-68. They also argue that courts have long accorded differing levels of evidentiary weight to different kinds of opinions; for instance, federal courts have long
treated decisions fiom the trial court level as nonprecedential. Therefore, there is
little reason to think the Framers would have regarded judicial issuance of a class of
unpublished, nonprecedential appellate opinions as marking any fundamental departure from the malleable law of precedent of their day or their conception of the
'judicial power." Id. at 168-73.
A few brief points in response: it is certainly plain from our modern vantage
point that stare decisis norms have evolved considerably over the centuries in America
and England-mostly toward strictness. It does not follow from this observation that:
(1) jurists from the time of the founding were equally aware of this evolution; or (2)
they would have accepted that the evolving nature of precedent gave courts a license
to create rules releasing themselves from the contemporaneous understanding of its
force.
It is also certainly true that courts have granted differing levels of deference (evidentiary weight) to differing classes of opinions, but the implications of this point are
contestable. As a threshold matter, it is possible to find opinions from the early Republic suggesting that, as one would expect tinder the declaratory theory, trial court
decisions merited some evidentiary weight. See, e.g., Waite v. The Antelope, 28 F. Cas.
1341, 1341 (D.C.D.S.C. 1807) (No. 17,045) (observing in district court opinion that
"[t]he case is new, and important, both as respects the parties, and as tending to
establish a precedent"); Ellison v. The Bellona, 8 F. Cas. 556, 557 (D.C.D.S.C. 1798)
(No. 4406) (expressing concern that district courf's opinion "may lead to the estab-
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have demolished such an argument somewhere in The FederalistNos.
78-83 by retorting that courts, which are "law-finders," lack the power
to change the legal principles that govern interpretation. The most
obvious explanation for Brutus's failure to attack the constitutional
silence on precedent is that he agreed; the notion that courts possessed a legislative authority to alter fundamentally the law governing
exercise of their power was off the table.
Summarizing this Part, the Anastasoff conclusion that the definition of the 'judicial power" as used in Article III necessarily entails
respect for precedent is implausible. Nonetheless, both Federalists
and Anti-Federalists expected that the new federal courts would operate subject to the constraints of the declaratory theory of precedent.
One supporting rationale for this expectation was that this norm, like
separation of powers, helps to control judicial discretion and prevent
it from reaching "arbitrary" levels. Another rationale can be gleaned
from a big dog-that-didn't-bark: a likely explanation for the Anti-Federalist's failure to attack the Constitution for failing to require respect
for precedent is that they, like their Federalist adversaries, believed
that the rules for construing law were defined by "law," "reason,"
"truth," and the like. Courts, which were regarded as law-finders
rather than lawmakers by the common law and separation-of-powers
theory of the day, would lack the authority to change these rules to
enhance their own power.
II.

CONGRESS, NOT THE COURTS,

ENJOYS

THE POWER

To

ELIMINATE

THE HORIZONTAL FORCE OF PRECEDENTS

Neither the Constitution nor early commentary provides a great
deal of help for solving the problem of whether the courts or Congress may eliminate the horizontal force of precedents. The Constitution itself has nothing express to say on the subject. The Framers'
limited discussions of precedent and the rules of legal interpretation
suggest that they would have rejected the notion that courts, which
they regarded as law-finders, possessed any such power. Perhaps the
modern force of this expectation is suspect, however, given that it is a
lishment of a precedent"). More generally, in a system that accords "evidentiary" or
presumptive weight to precedents, it is to be expected that courts would tend to
"weigh" different opinions (or classes of opinions) differently. That courts do so does
not suggest that they should also have the power to create new rules of "admissibility"
that permit them to refuse to give any weight at all to some opinions regardless

of

their intrinsic merit or importance. Put another way, declaratory-theory stare decisis
obligates courts to give precedents their due weight; the Framers would regard judicial abandonment of this obligation as marking a substantial, illegitimate change in
the law.
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twentieth (and twenty-first) century commonplace that the courts
make-rather than find-the law; we do not believe in the declaratory
theory anymore. Of course, the Framers had even less occasion to
discuss congressional authority to alter the rules governing legal
interpretation.
This absence of guidance suggests a need to analyze the problem
in light of the core purpose of separation of powers-to prevent tyranny by imposing external controls (i.e., law) on official discretion.
Legal limits on an official's discretion cannot serve this function if the
official is free to repeal them. One upshot of this principle is that,
regardless of whether one chooses to style courts as "law-finders" as
the Framers did, or as interstitial "lawmakers" in the more modern
fashion, the rule-of-law principles underlying separation-of-powers
block the courts from legislating increases to their own discretionary
power, which would be an effect of abandoning the constraint of hori5
zontal stare decisis.l

1

It does not follow, however, that the Constitution has frozen stare
decisis as the Framers knew it forever into place as a limit on judicial
action. Separation of powers is not hostile to official discretion per se;
rather, it is hostile to excessive, uncontrolled official discretion. Although courts cannot change the law to grab discretionary power for
themselves, there is considerable space for Congress, consistent with
the tyranny-blocking function of separation of powers, to change the
law to grant such power-provided doing so falls within the scope of
its enumerated powers.
The best place to look for congressional authority to regulate
precedential force is the Sweeping Clause, which permits Congress to
enact "all Laws .. .necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the . . .Powers vested" in the various departments of the federal gov-

ernment-including, of course, the judiciary.',5 2 To fall within the
reach of this clause, a statute regulating the courts' methods for
resolving cases must be amenable to the characterization that it
"carr[ies] into [e]xecution" judicial power. This requirement brings
us back to a fundamental issue emphasized by the Framers' discussion
of precedent: the courts cannot, as Hamilton put the matter, exercise
"arbitrary discretion."' 5 1 The power to create arbitrary rules of conduct is properly legislative, and therefore any statute that grants the
151 Cf infra notes 157-68 and accompanying text (discussing rule of law as a core
rationale for separation of powers).
152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; cf infra note 195 (noting alternative potential
sources of congressional power).
153 Cf.TuiE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 502.
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courts such authority could not implement properly 'judicial" power.
An analysis of the constitutionality of removing the constraining effects on courts of stare decisis therefore should explore whether doing so might increase the courts' discretion to impermissible levels in
some contexts.
Drawing the line between legislative and properly judicial (or executive) authority is a famously difficult problem that highlights a fundamental tension within separation-of-powers theory. For
government to function, its enforcement officials must possess some
measure of discretion; for the rule-of-law to exist, there must be meaningful (legal) limits on this discretion. There is no good, abstract answer to the problem of determining how much such discretion is too
much. The Supreme Court's response to this conundrum has been to
fashion the nondelegation doctrine, which ostensibly stands for the
principle that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to
others but, as practical matter, has been understood to permit it to
vest vast, virtually unlimited, discretion in enforcement branch officials. 5 4 For reasons discussed below, it is possible that a broad effort
by Congress to eliminate the horizontal force of precedents would
spur the courts to try a stricter approach to this doctrine. That said,
its current state suggests that Congress should have ample "elbow
room" to dispense with the horizontal force of many cases or categories of cases without impermissibly increasing the discretion ofjudges
to "legislative" levels.
The preceding might strike some, however, as skipping past a still
more basic separation-of-powers issue: does Congress have any business interfering with how courts go about determining the meaning of
the law in such a manner? If congressional alteration of stare decisis
norms were to interfere with the independence of the judiciary the
Constitution demands, then it would both violate separation of powers and fail Sweeping Clause analysis, for it cannot be "proper" to
usurp another branch's power.l5 5 On inspection, however, this objection is misplaced. As a threshold matter, Congress has been regulating judicial operations in rather intrusive ways for hundreds of years,
which at least suggests that such regulation does not constitute improper usurpation as a class. More to the present point, however, it
would seem a strain to characterize congressional elimination of horizontal force of precedents as seizing or usurping judicial power be154

See infra notes 175-84 and accompanying text (discussing contours of the

nondelegation doctrine).
155 See Lawson, supra note 9, at 203-04 (condemning as "improper" congressional
regulation of precedential norms).
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cause, in a given case, it would increasejudicial discretion-freeing the
courts from the weight of certain precedents could not force them to
adopt congressionally favored legal interpretations or case outcomes.
This analysis suggests that Congress may, with "propriety," release the
15 6
courts from the horizontal force of (many) precedents.
A.

Background Principles: Separation of Powers, Rule of Law, and How
Much Discretion Is Too Much?

Any government of laws exists in a state of permanent tension
between the immovable rock that law must constrain arbitrary official
power and the irresistible force that officials must possess enough discretion to govern. The immovable rock: for the Framers, it was a
given that tyranny, that undesirable state, exists where officials enjoy
absolute and arbitrary power (i.e., discretion) to do what they please
to those whom they govern.' 5 The rule of law imposes limits on official discretion and is thus tyranny's opposite. For law to constrain an
official's discretion, it must be the case that the official does not get to
make it up as she goes along. It follows that the official must consult
legal norms created on some other occasion-lawmaking must be separated in some meaningful fashion from law-application. The opposing irresistible force: law obviously cannot eliminate official
discretion-the limits of language and the exigencies of government
both require that officials enjoy a measure of discretionary power to
figure out the law and apply it sensibly as circumstances warrant.15
156 An actual challenge to the constitutionality of any congressional attempt to
eliminate precedential force could call into play at least one more separation-of-powers doctrine, but its analysis will be confined to this footnote. Scholars have characterized the Court as oscillating between highly formalistic and ad hoc, "balancing" (or
"functionalist") approaches to separation-of-powers issues. See, e.g., Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theoy of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (1994). Under the latter
approach, the Court essentially inquires whether a statute grants one branch undue
power to interfere with the "core" operations of another. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986) (observing that constitutionality of delegation of authority to an Article I court turned on whether it
"impermissibly undermined" the judicial branch); McCutchen, supra, at 5. For present purposes, perhaps the most one can usefully say about this balancing approach is
that its ad hoc nature would leave substantial room for judges offended by a given
form of congressional regulation of precedent to justify protecting their turf by declaring a separation-ot-powers violation.
157 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 307-10 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano
ed., 2000).
158 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (noting that the
Court applies the nondelegation doctrine in light of "a practical understanding that
in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and more technical
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This clash creates a line-drawing problem: how much enforcement
discretion is "too much" to be consistent with the rule of law and separation of powers? Confronted with a question that is basically impossible to answer in the abstract, the judicial solution has been, in a word,
to punt. The Supreme Court has come close to giving Congress carte
blanche to grant as much discretion as it chooses as a matter of policy
to the other departments. 159 The Court's easy acceptance of massive
delegations of discretionary power does not, however, render separation of powers a dead letter. At a minimum, it should remain the case
that discretion must be granted by law, not seized by the enforcers.
Regarding the tyranny-limiting function of separation of powers,
Madison famously observed in The FederalistNo. 47,
No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value, or is stamped
with the authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty, than that
... [t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pro1 0
nounced the very definition of tyranny. 6
This notion that, to forestall tyranny and preserve liberty, governmental powers should be assigned to distinct sets of officials had formed
an important strand of British political and legal thought since at least
the mid-seventeenth century. 16
The most famous exponent of separation of powers, and the one

most frequently cited by the Framers, was Montesquieu.16 2 He set
problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives").
159 See generally Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (discussing laxness of nondelegation precedents); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original
Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 370-72 (2002) (describing the moribund state of
nondelegation doctrine at the Supreme Court).
160 THE FEDERA-IST No. 47, supra note 157, at 307-08.
161 For a discussion of separation-of-powers thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries preceding Montesquieu, see GwN', supra note 9, at 3-99.
162 See MARTIN REDISI-, THE CONSTrIUTION As PoLrrICAL STRUCrURE 105 (1995)
("Despite Locke's influence, Montesquieu was invoked more often than any other
political authority in eighteenth-century America."). Madison described Montesquieu's work as follows:
The British Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the
didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered the work of the
immortal bard as the perfect model from which the principles and rules of
the epic art were to be drawn, and by which all similar works were to be
judged, so this great political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution
of England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the mirror of
political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form of elementary truths, the
several characteristic principles of that particular system.
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himself the task of devising an explanation for a fact he treated as
given-that the unwritten constitution of Britain maximized the "political liberty" of its subjects, an attribute he defined as "a tranquillity
[sic] of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his
safety."l1"' For this happy state to exist, "it is requisite the government
be so constituted as one man need not be afraid of another."' 16 4 To
eliminate such fear, the three great governmental powers-the legislative, executive, and judicial-must be properly (though not hermeti-

cally) separated. 16 5 Montesquieu defined these powers as follows:
In every government there are three sorts of power: the legislative;
the executive in respect to things dependent on the law of nations;
and the executive in regard to matters that depend on the civil law.
By virtue of the first, the prince or magistrate enacts temporary
or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those that have already
been enacted. By the second, he makes peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public security, and provides
against invasions. By the third, he punishes criminals, or determines the disputes that arise between individuals. The latter we
shall call the judiciary power, and the other simply the executive
power of the state.16

Hundreds of years of legal and political struggle demonstrate that determining the precise boundaries between the departments is a more
167
difficult project than this quick sketch might suggest.
TrlE FEDERALIST No. 47, supma note 157, at 308.
163 1 CHARLEs-Louis DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIr OF THE LAWS 163 (Thomas Nu-

gent trans., J.V. Prichard rev. ed., 1991) (1748).
164 1 id.
165 See 1 id. at 162-74.
166 1 id. at 162-63.
167 Depending on the rhetorical occasion, Madison in his guise of Publius seemed
to be of two minds concerning the difficulty of this project. In The Federalist No. 37,
his goal was to persuade readers that expectations for the proposed Constitution had
to be framed in light of the difficulties inherent in committing a governmental design
to paper. In this vein, he noted,
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has
yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three
great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary ....
Questions
daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns
in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra note 75, at 225-26. Later, in The FederalistNo. 48, Publius's goal was to persuade his readers that they had more to fear from legislative
usurpations than power-grabs by executive orjudicial authorities. In a passage that is
a little galling to anyone who has read many separation-of-powers opinions, he reassures his audience that "the executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more simple in its nature, and the judicialy being described by
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That said, their broad outlines are clear enough to make sense of
Montesquieu's claim that separating them ensures that "one man
need not be afraid of another" and Madison's proposition that combining them constitutes tyranny. The central division is between legislative and executive functions where the latter are broadly defined to
include any efforts to enforce the law. These executive functions are
further subdivided into an "executive power" which, among other
functions, "establishes the public security" and a 'judiciary power"
which resolves criminal and civil disputes. The tyrant who combines
all three can make up the law as she goes along and enforce it as she
pleases against anyone she chooses to prosecute for any reason, i.e., by
definition, the official possessing all three of the powers has absolute
discretion over the lives, liberty, and property of the governed.
James Wilson aptly described the dangers of combining legislative
and judicial powers as follows:
Let us suppose the legislative and judicial powers be united: what
would be the consequence? The lives, liberties, and properties of
the citizens would be committed to arbitrary judges, whose decisions would, in effect, be dictated by their own private opinions, and

would not be governed by any fixed or known principles of law. For
though, as judges, they might be bound to observe those principles;
yet, Proteus-like, they might immediately assume the form of legislators; and, in that shape, they might escape from every fetter and
obligation of law. 168
A central point of separation of powers is to keep us all out of Judge
Proteus's court and ensure that governmental officials with direct
power over individuals find their power constrained by preexisting
laws that they do not get to make up on the spot to suit the occasion.
Political liberty (in Montesquieu's sense) and rule of law are
coextensive.

But of course both the executive and judicial departments must
exercise discretion (smidgens of "tyranny") in many contexts-the
condition of being sufficiently constrained by law is a matter of degree. The President is to "take Care" that the laws are executed;1 1
70
the courts are to exercise the 'judicial Power" of the United States.'

At a rock-bottom minimum, some level of interpretivediscretion neceslandmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either of these departments

would immediately betray and defeat themselves." THE
(James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000).
168

1 WILSON, sulrt note 58, at 365.

169

U.S. CONST. art. 11,
1(. art. I1, § 1.

170

§ 3.

FEDERALIST

No. 48, at 317
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sarily inheres in these law-enforcement functions. 171 No legislature
could (or should) write laws sufficiently detailed that their application
is clear for all possible eventualities; no matter how specific the statute
(or Constitution), the enforcing powers always face the problem of
figuring out just what it "means" and what to do about it.
Moreover, our governmental system in many respects treats enforcement-branch discretion not as a necessary evil to be minimized
but as a positive good to be used rather than feared. In this regard, a
remarkable passage from The FederalistNo. 78 bears noting; in it, Hamilton defends the proposed federal courts on the ground that, like
state courts, they would use their interpretive discretion to "mitigat[e]
the severity and confin[e] the operation" of "unjust and impartial
laws" that Congress might enact when subject to "occasional ill
hlumors. '' ' 72 No doubt Congress would reject this stop-the-gouty-legislature-before-it's-ill-humored-again school of interpretation. As a matter of brute political fact, however, it frequently chooses as a matter of
policy to grant vast discretionary powers to the enforcers. Sometimes
such grants take the form of extraordinarily vague statutory language
that the executive and the judiciary must "interpret" to greater clarity. 173 Sometimes Congress is more direct and grants express and
wide discretion to administrators or judges to promulgate "rules"
which function, for almost all intents and purposes, with the same
74
force of law as statutes.'
To protect against a tyrannical imbalance, it might be helpful to
draw clear, bright-lines that define acceptable maximum levels of discretion for enforcement officials. The federal courts, however, have
more or less given up on this task, as demonstrated by the state of the
nondelegation doctrine. The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
171 Cf Lawson, supra note 159, at 337-43 (discussing the discretion inherent in
the interpretation and execution of laws).
172 TiiE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 501.
173 For instance, § I of the Sherman Act, an extraordinarily important statute,
proscribes "[e]very contract, combination ....or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2000). Taking this provision at face value presents problems because "[e]very agreement concerning trade . . .restrains." Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918). Rather than follow the literal text of the Sherman Act, the courts
have instead treated it as a command from Congress to develop a federal "common
law" of antitrust. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAl. ANTITRUST POLIcY 52 (2d ed. 1999).
174 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (authorizing the SEC to prescribe rules and regulations it deems "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors").
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States."' 175 That Congress may not delegate this legislative power to
another department is implicit in the very notion of separation of
powers, for, were Congress to do so, that department would impermissibly combine the legislative power with its own-and we would find
ourselves facing a Judge (or Commissioner or Tyrant) Proteus who
17 6
enjoys "arbitrary discretion."'
The great problem, of course, is to identify the point at which the
discretionary power incident to enforcing law becomes so great as to
become arbitrary or legislative. As a matter of hornbook doctrine, the
Supreme Court has stated that delegations of power to enforcement
officials will survive such challenges provided Congress has provided
an "intelligible principle" to guide their actions which enables the
courts to determine compliance. 177 This empty formula does nothing
to specify how vague "principles" can be and still be "intelligible"
enough to pass muster. In 1935, the Supreme Court invoked it to
strike provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA),
which granted President Roosevelt more or less total authority to run
the nation's economy as he saw fit to drag the country out of depression. 178 Since this 1935 aberration, however, the Supreme Court has
17
been willing to find "intelligible principles" wherever it looks. )
Famous examples of delegations the court has deemed suitably
"constrained" by law to survive a nondelegation challenge have in175 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
176 For an alternative, textual route to this same conclusion, see Lawson, supra
note 159, at 350 (arguing that Congress may not delegate its legislative power because

it lacks any enumerated power to do so, and that its Sweeping Clause authority to
enact laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution the powers of the other
branches does not extend to improperly granting legislative power to executive or
judicial officials). By contrast, for ajudicial rejection of the nondelegation doctrine,
see Whitman v. Ameican Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489-90 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (opining that nothing in the Constitution blocks Congress from delegating legislative power and that the Court should therefore abandon attempts to fashion a nondelegation doctrine).
177 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a

forbidden delegation of legislative power.").
178 A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935)
(striking provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act ofJune 16, 1933, 48 Stat.
195, that authorized executive creation of' "fair competition" codes); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking provisions of NIRA granting President dis-

cretionary power to prohibit transportation in interstate commerce of oil produced or
shipped in violation of state law).

179

See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (noting that the Court has not found a

nondelegation violation since Schecter and Panama Refining in 1935).
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cluded: the FCC's power to regulate in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity"; 811 the power of the Office of Price
Administration during World War II to set "fair and equitable" commodity prices;"" the power of the United States Sentencing Commission, "an independent commission in the judicial branch of the
United States," to issue binding sentencing guidelines for the punishment of federal crimes in light of a melange of vague, indeterminate
"goals," "purposes," and "factors"; 8 2 and, most recently, the power of
the EPA to issue air quality regulations that are "'requisite to protect
the public health' with 'an adequate margin of safety."" " Reconciling such cases with the Court's decision to strike NIRA suggests that
the nondelegation doctrine boils down to: do not let somebody other
than Congress decide everything.
Justice Scalia, a champion of bright-lines if ever there were one,
has aptly summarized why the nondelegation doctrine has failed to
delineate meaningfully the amounts of permissible enforcementbranch discretion:
Once it is conceded, as it must be, that no statute can be entirely
precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments involving

policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law
and to the judges applying it, the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a point of principle but over a
question of degree ....
[I]t is small wonder that we have almost
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permis-

sible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing
8
or applying the law. '

180
181
182

4

Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943).
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 427 (1944).
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374-76 (1989). As evidence that the

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the Commission, suitably restrained its
discretion, the Court observed that the Act requires the Commission to craft its
sentences in light of three "goals," four "purposes," and eighteen "factors." Id. The
four "purposes" give a sense of the constraining effect of this m6lange; as the Commission creates its sentencing guidelines, it should consider that sentences are supposed
"'to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to
provide just punishment for the offense'; 'to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct'; 'to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant'; and 'to provide the defendant with needed ... correctional treatment.'" [d. at 374 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2000)).
183 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465, 476 (upholding section 109(b) (1) of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1), against nondelegation challenge and noting that it "fits
comfortably within the scope of discretion permitted by our precedent").
184

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The upshot of this observation, and decades of Supreme Court
jurisprudence permitting the rise of the modern administrative state
with its massive delegations, is that courts will stoutly reject almost all
claims that Congress has granted too much discretionary authority to
other officials. Every couple of centuries or so, a truly huge delegation may, like NIRA, prove more than the Court can tolerate, but, this
caveat notwithstanding, nondelegation-doctrine-type tests (which
would include Hamilton's dictum that courts may not exercise "arbitrary discretion") are not a promising means for blocking the accumulation of tyrannical authority.
It does not follow from this conclusion, however, that separation
of powers must be meaningless. A key remaining barrier to tyranny is,
bluntly, that the rule of law requires the enforcing branches to obey the
law. The impossibility of devising and administering meaningful
"amount-of-discretion" tests means that the "law" binding the enforcers may be very vague indeed and grant them vast discretion. Still, it is
an obvious, almost self-evident, requirement of separation of powers
that the enforcers cannot expand their own powers by altering the law
defining the scope of their authority. Indeed, acceptance of this principle by both Federalists and Anti-Federalists may be the best explanation for the relative absence of substantive discussion of the nature of
the judicial power during the ratification debates; there was no pressing need to discuss speculative issues such as whether the Article III
'judicial power" by definition entails respect for precedent because
the courts would not be at liberty to increase their power by abandoning the legal rules limiting it. 18 5 Were matters otherwise, if, for

example, executive or judicial officers could "legislate" their way to
greater powers which they could then enforce, tyranny would naturally ensue as they followed their natural inclinations to expand their
authority. 1186
In short, given the lax state of the nondelegation doctrine, Congress has immense power to decide for itself the amount of discretionary power to grant to the enforcers-executive and judicial officials.
The rule of law, however, forbids the enforcers from seizing more discretionary power than the law has granted them.

185 Cf supra Part I.B.3.
186 Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 167, at 316 ("It will not he denied, that
power is of an encroaching nature .... ").
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The Federal Courts Lack Authority To Abandon the Stare Decisis
Constraints with Which They Started

The federal courts began their lives with an obligation to defer to
precedents as required by the declaratory theory then in vogue, i.e.,
they were to treat precedents as evidence of law and either follow
them or give a good reason why not. 18 7 This rule limited the courts'
interpretive discretion. They cannot, consistent with rule of law and
separation of powers, increase this discretion by abandoning this particular constraint absent authorization from some law to do so.
Neither the Constitution nor common-law principles grant this authorization; therefore, the courts are stuck with this obligation to defer to precedent except to the degree Congress relieves them of it.
Reflect for a moment on the unpleasantness of Judge Proteus's
traffic court, where the judge decides the speed limit even as he decides whether you broke it, thus combining legislative and judicial
powers.' 8 1 Stare decisis helps block such discretion both by requiring
the judge to defer to past speed-limit decisions as well as by forcing
her to consider that whatever rule she creates today she may have to
apply tomorrow in a different case. 189 Of course, application of measured deference to precedent requires fuzzy, qualitative judgmentsbright lines and clear rules cannot precisely calibrate just how bad a
precedent should be to justify overruling it or specify exactly the range
and weight of the qualitative factors that a court should consider when
making this decision (for example, stability of the law, policy concerns, etc.). One should not, however, permit the difficulty of applying this form of stare decisis in close cases to obscure the obvious
limiting effects of precedents in the run of cases. It is easy to see the
force of this point by contrasting the power available to a court inter187 See generally supra Part I.
188 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (introducing Judge Proteus).
189 Bush v. Gore, by and by, provides an interesting example of the Supreme Court
seemingly trying to minimize the impact of the prospective force of precedent in order to expand its decisionmaking power. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Bush HI).
The per curiam opinion in that case capped its equal protection analysis with the
observation that "[o]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities." Id. at 109. In one sense, this remark was gratuitous-a common-law court's
opinion can always be distinguished by a later court deciding a case it concludes
presents different operative facts. The justices who joined the per curiam opinion
nonetheless included dicta limiting it to its facts. Presumably, they felt that by minimizing or eliminating the force of Bush II as an equal protection precedent, they
would minimize the danger that this hurried opinion crafted in emergency circumstances would distort election law going forward. In short, minimizing Bush II's future impact helped the Court maximize its decisionmaking freedom.
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preting the meaning of "due process" in a case of first impression with
that of a court with an obligation to fit its interpretation into the
fabric of scores of precedents. The thicker the case law that "liquidates" a bit of vague constitutional (or other legal) text, the less interpretive freedom a court will have in further expounding it. 91
Once one characterizes stare decisis as law that limits judicial discretion, it becomes plain that courts cannot abandon it absent some
sort of legal authorization to do so in light of the principle that the
enforcing branches cannot seize power for themselves. At first blush,
it might seem obvious that the courts do possess such authority, and
the argument might run as follows: at the time of the founding, stare
decisis was a creature of the common law. Although (old, dead, silly)
legal thinkers of that time commonly held that the courts "find" or
"discover" common-law principles, we moderns know that they really
just make them up. What the courts have the common-law power to
make, they have the common-law power to destroy-and so they have
the power to abandon the constraints of stare decisis.
This argument fails to recognize that what we now choose to call
the "lawmaking" power of courts operating in a common-law tradition
is a function of the limitation that stare decisis has placed on their
power to interpret law in the first place. Judicial decisions have lawlike effects beyond an individual case precisely because, as a predictive
matter, we know that judges in later cases will tend to follow them. 1 9 1
A court that develops a new wrinkle of contract or tort law has "made"
new "law" in the sense that other courts can be expected to follow its
lead. So long as a court exercises this power incrementally and as an
incident to its case resolution function, such de facto "lawmaking"
does not amount to an improper seizure of legislative power. Rather,
it is better characterized as an unavoidable side effect of subjecting
the courts' function of interpreting the law to the rigors of stare decisis. In such an environment, judicial interpretations will tend to act so
much like law that it does no violence to language to take the positivist
stance and state that they are law. It is nonsensical, however, to suggest that a limited power to make "law," which flows from the existence of
stare decisis, can form a legal basis for the courts to abandon that
doctrine.

190 Cf Richards & Kritzer, supra note 29 (analyzing effects of precedents on Supreme Court decisionmaking).
191 As Professor Harrison has aptly remarked, "Courts do not follow precedent
because other courts conclusively gloss the law. Courts can conclusively gloss the law
because other courts follow precedent." Harrison, supra note 18, at 512.
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Nor should one construe the Constitution to grant such authority. It contains no express instructions on respect for precedent, but it
does provide courts with the 'judicial power" to resolve certain categories of "Cases" and "Controversies." 19 2 Exercise of that power requires
courts to use independent judgment concerning the meaning of law.
It may be tempting to conclude that, because courts in some sense
"control" interpretation and stare decisis is a sort of interpretive
norm, they must possess authority to determine whether to adhere to
it. The power to interpret law does not carry with it, however, authority to rewrite at will the norms that govern interpretation of law. Were
courts free, constitutionally speaking, to make up new, arbitrary
norms for themselves, then nothing would stop a court from, for instance, declaring a new "interpretive" norm that even-numbered
amendments in the Constitution do not count. If courts possess such
power, then there was no point to writing down the Constitution or
other law.'9 31
Some interpretive norms have, through repeated invocation over
the years (or centuries), evolved into something more than mere accepted understandings or rules of thumb to aid interpretation; they
have, for relevant intents and purposes, hardened into law-for example, Blackstone and others make clear that common-law courts at the
time of the founding had an obligation to follow rational precedents
94
rather than impose their own "best" readings of indeterminate law.'1
As they exercise their judicial power in any given case, courts enjoy
independent authority to interpret and apply this meta-law of interpretation-it is up to a court to determine if precedents are on point
and reasonable enough to command deference in a given case. This
power to interpret and apply stare decisis does not fairly carry with it,
however, authority to "interpret" it out of existence.
Separation of powers must at minimum forbid the enforcing
branches from increasing their own powers beyond those authorized
by law. Neither the courts' common-law "lawmaking" powers nor the
Constitution's grant of 'judicial power" authorize courts to abandon
the original constraints of stare decisis with which they started. The
only other place to look for such authority is Congress.
192 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
193 Cf supra Part I.B.3 (discussing Hamilton and Brutus on rules of legal
interpretation).
194 Cf Harrison, supra note 18, at 529 ("The norms of precedent as the federal
courts know them consist mainly of unwritten principles that are characterized as
binding law but that reflect substantial judicial input, custom, and practice. Those are
the hallmarks of general law.").

See generally supra Part I.A.
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Congress's Sweeping Clause Power To Release the Courts from Stare
Decisis and Its Separation-of-PowersLimits

The principle that courts may not seize extra-legal power does
not prevent Congress, subject to constitutional limits, from granting
it-that is, making it legal. One potential source of congressional
power to regulate the operation of precedent in the courts is the
Sweeping Clause, which authorizes Congress "[t] o make all laws which
shall be necessary and properfor carryinginto Execution ... all ... Powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or
in any Department or Officer thereof" 19 5-including
the judicial
department.
To fall within the scope of this clause, a statute regulating the
force of precedent would need to satisfy several related requirements.
First, it must be the case that the statute is a means for "carrying into
execution" the power that the Constitution vests in the courts for
resolving cases, that is, the 'Judicial" power. For present purposes, the
most salient application of this principle is that Congress may not
eliminate the coercive force of so much precedent as to grant "arbitrary discretion" to the courts in violation of the nondelegation doctrine (or something like it, at all odds), because doing so would force
the courts to wield legislative, rather than judicial, power.
In addition, a statute regulating precedent would have to be both
"necessary" and "proper" for carrying the judicial power into execution. On a standard McCulloch v. Maryland analysis, this twin standard
is quite lax-in essence, a statute will satisfy it so long as one can say
195 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (emphases added). Two other constitutional
clauses speak to congressional power over the courts. The Tribunals Clause of Article
I grants Congress the power "[to] constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9, and some have argued that the greater power to "constitute" carries with it the "lesser" power to regulate the operations of these courts. See
David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999
BYU L. REV. 75, 105-08 (collecting and criticizing judicial authority and scholarly
commentary on this point). Power to regulate the operation of the Supreme Court
(at least in cases outside its small original jurisdiction) has been said to flow from
Article III's Exceptions Clause, which provides that "the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. For present
purposes, it is not necessary to determine whether any congressional power that
might exist under these two clauses extends to regulation of stare decisis norms because the Sweeping Clause provides sufficient authority in itself. It should be noted
that one reason to avoid relying on the Tribunals and Exceptions Clauses is that Professor David Engdahl has recently made a strong case that the Sweeping Clause is the
exclusive source of any congressional power to regulate judicial operations. See Engdahl, supra, at 104-32.
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that it amounts to a minimally reasonable means to accomplish a permissible constitutional end.' 11"Many potential stare-decisis-stripping
statutes ought to be able to satisfy the rationality requirement for "necessity"-if for no other reason than that it would not seem irrational
for Congress to conclude that the judicial power would function better if courts based their legal conclusions on their own "best," independent judgments rather than submitting to the coercive force of
-7
opinions that they now deem incorrect. '
The "propriety" requirement that legislation seek to achieve a
permissible end is of special concern in this context, however, because
statutory regulation of precedent amounts to congressional control of
the operation of another department's power. '- 8 We once again must
circle back to separation of powers, for, as Professor Gary Lawson has
recently argued, it cannot be "proper" for a busybody Congress to regulate the operation of the judicial power in a manner that unduly
intrudes on the independence of the Article III courts.Iw) The better
view on both theoretical and practical grounds, however, is that separation of powers does not protect the independence of the courts by
preventing Congress, the lawmaker, from using laws to regulate the
courts, the law-enforcers. Rather, separation of powers protects judicial independence by preventing Congress from usurping the judicial
power for itself. Congressional abrogation of horizontal stare decisis
would not enable Congress to control case outcomes directly by issuing judgments itself or to force the courts to adopt any given interpretation of the .Constitution. As explained below, adoption of this
practice therefore would not usurp the judicial power in any constitutionally offensive sense.

196 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.)
(construing "necessary" as "convenient, or useful, or essential to another").
197 ,See Harrison, supra note 18, at 533-38 (making standard-form McCulloch arguments to support a variety of hypothetical statutes regulating precedential norms to
achieve systemic ends such as enhancing stability, predictability, and uniformity of the
law).

198 Cf Engdahl, supra note 195, at 158-64 (stressing the importance of this point
for Sweeping Clause analysis, and arguing that, rather than apply standard McCulloch
rational basis test, courts should exercise independent judgment to determine
whether congressional regulation of the judiciary in fact helps effectuate exercise of
the judicial power, which would call into question statutes regulating prudential

standing, abstention, and remedies).
199 Lawson, supra note 9, at 203-05; cf Engdahl, supra note 195, at 164-74 (arguing that courts should adopt more aggressive scrutiny of congressional efforts to regulate judicial operations).
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1. Stare-Decisis-Stripping Statutes Seen Through a Nondelegation
Lens
Any law implicitly delegates to those charged with enforcing and
applying it the interpretive discretion to figure out what it means.
The vaguer the law, the greater the implicit grant. Stare decisis tends
to obscure the otherwise obvious point that vague laws delegate power
to the courts that apply them because, over time, it tends to limit discretion as repeated expounding "liquidates" meaning, to use one of
2 °1 Stripping precedents
the terms Madison favored. 11
of their coercive
effects may be thought of as throwing this process into reverse-of
expanding thejudiciary's power to either "make" or "interpret" law, as
the case may be. One separation-of-powers problem, then, is to determine the degree to which Congress may strip cases of precedential
force without leaving the courts with so much discretion as to transform them from bona fide judicial interpreters of the law into
21
legislators. 1'
In the past, courts have developed and applied the nondelegation doctrine to determine whether an affirmative grant of power by
Congress to the enforcing branches (for example, to grant licenses,
fix prices, etc.) grants them excessive discretion. As Justice Scalia explained in Mistretta, attempts to draw bright, abstract lines around the
outer bounds of such discretion are basically doomed by the nature of
the task, which calls for qualitative judgment regarding a "question of
degree" rather than a "point of principle." 2' 11 2 The meaningless black-

letter standard is that a delegation will pass muster so long as Congress encodes some sort of "intelligible principle" (i.e., smidgen of
200

See

THE FEDERAIiST

No. 37, supra note 75, at 226.

201 Nondelegation challenges are perhaps more typically made to grants of power
to executive branch officials, but, as the doctrine forbids Congress to delegate legislative power to any other entity, it also applies to delegations to the courts. Mistretta v.
United States, 448 U.S. 361, 415-16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating that
nondelegation doctrine applies both to "officers executing the law and to the judges
applying it"); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.)
(turning back nondelegation challenge to statute that granted authority to the Supreme Court to prescribe the "forms of writs, executions, and other processes" applicable in lower federal courts). For discussion of the point that if a statute is too vague,
it delegates "legislative" power to the courts that then graft meaning onto it, see Lawson, supra note 159, at 340 ("The courts and the President exceed their enumerated
powers by purporting to give meaning to gibberish just as surely as they would exceed

their enumerated powers by directly inserting their own texts into the Statutes at
Large.").

202

Miiretta, 488 U.S. at 415-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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it.2113 Only the most extreme, vast, unintelligible delegations
have failed this so-called test, for example, the Supreme Court struck
Congress's effort to authorize President Roosevelt to do whatever he

law) into

saw fit to drag the country out of the Great Depression.2Y1 4 Thus, ap-

plication of the nondelegation doctrine in its traditional context has,
boiled down to a sort of shock-the-judicial-conscience test: a statutory
increase to enforcement branch discretion can only violate this "doctrine" if the judges deciding the matter intuit that Congress has gone
2
way beyond the pale.

15
1

A stare-decisis-stripping statute would expand judicial discretion
not by affirmatively granting the courts some new sphere of authority
(for example, to "interpret" to relative clarity some new, regulatory
statute) but by negating the constraining force of precedents on their
decisionmaking. In one sense, this is a distinction without a difference: regardless of whether Congress increases judicial discretion by
granting power or removing restraints, the generic question is
whether Congress has taken an action which lets the courts make law
in some impermissible sense.
Nonetheless, although a stare-decisis-stripping statute would not
fundamentally change the nature of the separation-of-powers question, it might well cause courts to approach and answer it differently.
Again, courts must use qualitative judgment to determine the outer
bounds of permissible "nonlegislative" discretion. In the past, they
have made such judgments in a system that expects deference to precedent. It seems quite plausible that judicial intuitions regarding the
outer limits on vague delegations have been influenced by judges'
background knowledge that stare decisis may both clarify and confine
the discretion of executive and judicial officers over time. 206 Were
Congress to undermine this fundamental expectation, one can easily
203 See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text (sketching contours of nondelegation doctrine).

204

SeeA.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935)

(invalidating the National Industrial Relations Act's delegation of authority to Presi-

dent to promulgate "fair competition" codes).
205 For a recent argument that the Constitution demands a stricter nondelegation
doctrine than the Supreme Court's deferential approach, see generally Lawson, supra
note 159, passim.
206 Executive-branch "precedents" may trigger a similar dynamic. Courts grant a
limited fbrm of stare decisis force to agency actions in the sense that they require "an
agency changing its course" on matters of policy to supply a "reasoned analysis" justifying its decision. Motor Vehicles Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42 (1983). The fbrce of its past decisions therefore modestly limits agency
discretion going forward-an effect that may make courts, at least on some level,

somewhat more comfortable with vast delegations to executive officials.
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imagine that courts would find it much easier to "intuit" nondelegation violations, thus forcing Congress to provide such clarity itself.
Stipulate then, that courts might not apply the same extraordinarily deferential nondelegation approach in a world rife with aggressive
stare-decisis-stripping statutes. Even so, once one accepts the irresistible premise that separation of powers permits judicial enforcement of
laws of far less than crystal clarity, it should easily follow that there are
many contexts in which Congress could deprive select cases or categories of cases of horizontal precedential force without expanding judicial discretion beyond acceptable levels. Any field occupied by a
moderately detailed statute might be considered to have enough law
to control the courts. It is perfectly plausible that code-type laws could
pass muster without the "thickening" effects of coercive precedentsindeed, that is the way the 'judicial power" tends to work in civil
systems.
Also, there are obviously many thousands of trivial decisions in
the thousands of volumes of reported federal cases; because such decisions do little if anything to add to the "law," they do little if anything
to reduce the discretion of the courts going forward. It would therefore be odd to conclude that a congressional move to deprive such
trivial decisions of precedential weight would impermissibly increase
judicial discretion.
Of course, freeing the courts from the coercive effects of more
important and controversial cases would grant them more discretion
than freeing them from repetitious trivia.2 0 7 Even so, stripping individual cases of their coercive stare decisis effects-especially recent
ones that have not yet had much formative effect on the law-should
not be problematic as a general matter. Suppose opinion X is a recent and important Supreme Court decision that is the hundredth
case to interpret the meaning of "due process," "speech," "unreasonable searches," or any other vague bit of the Constitution prone to stirring up controversy. If Congress were to strip X of its coercive stare
decisis effect, then, when case Y comes along raising the same issue,
the Court would find itself with the same degree of interpretive discretion that it had when it decided case Xin the first place. If the Court
did not have unconstitutionally broad discretionary power when it decided X, then it should not have excessive discretion when it later decides Ywithout being subject to any coercive force from X.
207 This is, of course, the sort of targeting Professor Paulsen has in mind. See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1541 (arguing for the abrogation of horizontal force of Roe and
Casey).
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For instance, the Court did not have unconstitutionally broad discretion to determine the meaning of the Commerce Clause when it
decided the 1995 case United States v. Lopez, 2181 a controversial, five-tofour opinion that marked the beginning of an effort to undermine
some of the more expansive New Deal interpretations of the Commerce Power. Stripping Lopez of its precedential force (along with
United States v. Morrison,201 a 2000 case that followed Lopez) would put
the Court back into the interpretive posture it inhabited in 1994-and
it was hardly illegal for courts to construe the Commerce Power at that
time.
Following a similar logic to a perhaps less provocative conclusion,
Congress could, without offending separation of powers by granting
the ourts too much interpretive discretion, enact a statute providing
that any five-to-four opinions issued by the Supreme Court in the future will lack horizontal precedential force. If the Court did not have
unconstitutionally broad discretion to decide a given five-to-four opinion, then it could not have unconstitutionally broad discretion to revisit the legal issues resolved in that opinion free of its constraining
effects. Such legislation could have two potentially beneficial effects.
First, it would do away with the unseemliness of narrowly divided, fiveto-four decisions purporting to "settle" the law. Second, to the degree
justices want the imprimatur of "precedent" on their opinions, it
would encourage them to engage in more consensus decisionmaking-deals would have to be made to acquire the critical sixth vote.
But could Congress destroy the precedential force of so many
cases as to step over the nondelegation line by granting the courts
"arbitrary" discretion? As qualitative, judicial judgments form the
outer limits of acceptable delegations, answering this question necessarily veers into speculation. This cautionary point duly noted, the
answer to the question is: probably yes-at least in the limited sense,
that one can imagine that such aggressive congressional interference
might prompt courts to put teeth in the nondelegation doctrine and
strike statutes that easily survive scrutiny under the doctrine's current
form.

Analysis of the nondelegation-type implications of such statutes
depends in part on whether they target statutory or constitutional con208 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (striking a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 that made it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm in a school
zone for exceeding congressional power to regulate activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce).
209 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (following Lopez and striking the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act for exceeding congressional power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce).
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structions. As a political matter, it would of course be far more provocative for Congress to target constitutional constructions than
constructions of statutes that it has the power to rewrite in any event.
It is therefore ironic that stripping the precedential force from statutory constructions may pose the greater nondelegation concern as a
legal matter.
a.

Stripping Precedential Force from Judicial Statutory
Interpretations

The structure of the nondelegation doctrine suggests that, as a
matter of formal doctrine, Congress should be able to eliminate the
precedential force of all judicial statutory constructions without causing a violation. As suggested above, however, a wholesale effort to deprive the courts of the power to "fix" the meaning of statutes through
precedents could prompt them to limit the scope of permissible delegations more aggressively. The upshot: Congress might find that,
were it to block courts from using precedents to narrow and clarify
statutory meaning, they might respond by striking statutes that would
easily survive any challenge under traditional nondelegation norms.
Formally speaking, judicial statutory constructions should only be
able to affect nondelegation analysis if their narrowing effects can legitimize delegations that are otherwise impermissibly broad. If precedents lack such "curative" effects, then, by hypothesis, they cannot
alter outcomes-either a statute violated the nondelegation doctrine
from its inception or it did not, and no gloss a court might add later
can change the result. By contrast, if the law does permit precedents
to cure violations, then stripping them of their stare decisis force
could cause statutes that were impermissibly broad standing by themselves to suffer a relapse of their nondelegation disease.
Dicta from the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations strongly suggest that such judicial cures
are not possible. 2 1" In its opinion below, the D.C. Circuit had held
that EPA's broad authority under the Clean Air Act to issue national
ambient air quality standards (NAAQs) "requisite to protect the public health" violated the nondelegation doctrine. 2 1 It also made the
novel suggestion that this violation could be cured were EPA to adopt
a narrowing construction of its authority. 2 12 The Supreme Court, in
short order: (1) ruled that EPA's NAAQ power plainly did not violate
210

See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).

211 Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir.
1999), modified by 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
212 Id. at 1038.
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the nondelegation doctrine;2 13 and (2) stated in dicta that, if there
2 14
had been a violation, EPA could not have cured it after the fact.

The Court reasoned,
The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless
delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power
seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power to exercise-that is to say, the prescription of the
itself be an exercise of
standard that Congress had omitted-would
2 15
authority.
legislative
the forbidden
Although aimed at executive officials, the logic of this observation seems to apply with equal force to the courts. Ajudge seeking to
narrow a truly "standardless" delegation would have no choice but to
rewrite it, that is, to legislate the standards that Congress left out. As
Whitman concisely explained, it is a self-contradiction to suggest that
an enforcement official could legislate a cure to a violation of the
nondelegation doctrine, which forbids such officials-whether judicial or executive-from legislating. It should follow that, at least on
the level of formal doctrine, judicial statutory constructions cannot
cure true nondelegation violations. If this conclusion is correct, it
should follow that Congress could strip away the precedential force of
all such opinions without creating a "fresh" violation.

Even if one grants, however, that the nondelegation doctrine
should not logically pose a barrier to congressional elimination of the
precedential force of judicial statutory constructions, legislation seeking to accomplish this end could surely have a profound impact on
the courts' application of that doctrine. Again, the nondelegation
doctrine forces courts to intuit how much enforcement discretion is
"too much." Stare decisis narrows enforcement discretion. Even if its
narrowing effects are in some formal sense irrelevant to nondelegation analysis, destroying them would surely affect judges' qualitative,
intuitive judgments regarding how much discretion is "too much" and
could prompt them to take a harder line against broad, vague
delegations.
For example, few would suggest that the Sherman Act,2'

6

as am-

plified by mountains of precedents, violates the nondelegation doctrine. 21 7 Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes contracts in "restraint of
213
214
215

Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 473.

216 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
217 A Westlaw search in ALLFEDS and ALLFEDS-OLD for the term "nondelega-

tion" ini the same paragraph as 'Sherman Act" found no cases. At least

one scholar,
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trade" criminal.2 18 The problem with taking this statutory command
literally is that all contracts "restrain" trade, 2 19 but obviously not all
contracts are crimes. This provision must mean something else and, if
courts are totally free to determine that "something else" for themselves on an ad hoc basis, then they threaten to become the "tyrants"
of business. Congress, of course, never intended to grant the courts
such power. Rather, it drafted this extraordinarily vague statute with
the understanding that the courts would develop a consistent body of
case law interpreting it-a federal "common law" of antitrust.2 2 0 Suppose that Congress had instead included a provision in the Sherman
Act that courts must never give any weight to their precedents interpreting it. One can easily imagine that it would cause courts to reject
§ 1 as an impossibly vague violation of separation of powers-regardless of whether the existence of constraining precedents technically
should be irrelevant to the nondelegation problem.
b.

Could the Constitution Left to Itself Leave the Courts with
Unconstitutionally Broad Discretion?

The most provocative issues regarding congressional power to
eliminate precedential force arise in the context of constitutional construction-after all, Congress can rewrite statutes to void the force of
statutory constructions it dislikes, but it cannot revrite the Constitution. It is actually quite difficult, however, to support the argument
that stripping constitutional constructions of their precedential force
could violate the nondelegation doctrine. The key problem with such
a claim is that it presupposes that the Constitution granted its early

interpreters a level of discretion that would now be considered unconstitutionally broad.
Recall the Lopez argument-the effect of removing the precedential force from a recent Supreme Court opinion would be simply to
put the Court back into the interpretive posture it occupied prior to
issuing that decision. 22 1 Taking this argument to its extreme, one
however, has contended that, given the Supreme Court's loose approach to interpreting it, the Sherman Act does violate the nondelegation doctrine. See Thomas C. Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt:.jettisoningthe ConstitutionalSherman Act, 74 CAL. L. REV.
266, 328 n.367 (1986).
218 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.").
219 See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.").
220 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 173, at 52.
221 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
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might argue that it could not possibly grant the courts unconstitutionally broad discretion to strip all constitutional constructions of their
precedential weight because doing so would simply put the courts
back into the position they confronted immediately after ratification.
It was not unconstitutional for the first Supreme Court to construe the
Constitution without the benefit of precedents; ergo, it could not be
unconstitutional for later courts to do so.
Indeed, stepping back, one could argue that the Constitution itself is the best evidence that something roughly as lax as the current
nondelegation doctrine is an appropriate separation-of-powers test for
determining the validity of delegations of interpretive authority to the

courts. Although some bits of the Constitution are as specific as anyone could like (for example, no one has suggested that the President
need only be thirty-five "dog-years" old),2 2 2 other bits, to put the matter mildly, are indeterminate and leave room for a vast zone of reasonable interpretation. Were this not the case, we would not, twohundred-some years after the fact, be debating the meaning of words
and phrases like 'judicial power" and "due process." By definition,
the Constitution cannot vest unconstitutionallybroad discretion in officials. This point suggests that a law cannot violate separation of powers due to vagueness so long as it is no fuzzier than the most
indeterminate bits of the Constitution.
Taken to this extreme, however, the argument has shifted into
question-begging because it has not excluded the uncomfortable possibility that the Constitution does not permit the courts to retain the
level of interpretive discretion that they necessarily had immediately
after ratification. An argument for this position could run as follows:
the Framers faced the enormous problem of drafting a constitution-a
broad, foundational document that needed to be brief and general
and that most people would agree to ratify. They could not and were
not trying to draft a code. They made the trade-off that it would be

better for specific constitutional interpretations to grow organically
from a course of practice (as precedents "fixed" and "liquidated"
vague text) than to try to circumvent this process by writing an impossibly specific document.2 2 That courts would necessarily enjoy enormous interpretive discretion as they decided constitutional cases of
first impression should be regarded as a necessary evil and not as an
Cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.5 (stating that "neither shall any Person be eligi222
le to [the office of the Presidency] who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
five Years").
223 Compare supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text, discussing expectations of
Madison and Hamilton that precedents woIld "liquidate" constitutional meaning
over time.
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indication that it would be constitutional for courts to continue to
exercise so much discretion in later cases.
The key premise of this argument is that litigants in the early days
of the Republic could be subjected to levels of 'judicial" discretion
that would be considered "nonjudicial" or "legislative" as applied to
later litigants. If one is willing to accept this jarring proposition, then
one can argue that modern courts could invoke some form of the
nondelegation doctrine to block stare-decisis-stripping statutes from
granting them the same vast amounts of interpretive discretion which
the Constitution itself "constitutionally" delegated to the courts of the
early Republic. Such an argument would require a court to embrace
the uncomfortable proposition that the Constitution is, after a fashion, unconstitutionally vague. If a court were willing to bite this conceptual bullet, however, given: (1) the extreme fuzziness of many
important constitutional provisions; and (2) that the outer limits of
properly 'judicial" discretion are a matter of qualitative judgment, the
contention that Congress could not constitutionally eliminate the
force of all constitutional precedents is at least plausible. Such reasoning could also lead to the conclusion that Congress could not, for
example, wipe the Supreme Court's "due process" slate clean.
In sum, without enough law on hand to constrain their discretion, courts cannot exercise judicial power-for a judge with too
much arbitrary (legislative) power is actually a tyrant. The great difficulty is to determine the tipping point where discretion exceeds constitutional limits. In all but the most extreme cases, courts have in the
past deferred to congressional determinations with regard to how
much discretion enforcement officials may permissibly exercise.
Stare-decisis-stripping statutes, however, could undermine longstanding judicial expectations regarding the narrowing and clarifying effects of precedents on the law, which could prompt courts to adopt a
more aggressive approach to nondelegation enforcement. The effective outer limits of any congressional stare-decisis-stripping power
must therefore remain hazy. That said, given the courts' traditional
willingness to permit executive and judicial officials to exercise significant discretion, Congress should possess sufficient elbow room to strip
many cases or categories of cases of their precedential force (including many "important" ones) while still leaving the courts sufficiently
constrained to exercise merely judicial power. It follows that many
potential stare-decisis-stripping statutes could be characterized as "carrying into execution" properly the 'judicial power" within the meaning of the Sweeping Clause.
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Congress May "Properly" Eliminate the Horizontal Coercive
Force of Precedents

The next issue to consider is whether Congress could enact a
stare-decisis-stripping statute as a "necessary and proper" means for
carrying into execution the judicial power pursuant to the Sweeping
Clause.22 4 Under a standard McCulloch analysis, an executory law will
fall within the ambit of this congressional power provided it amounts
225
to a minimally rational means of accomplishing a permissible end.
Again, it would be difficult to make the argument that removal of the
coercive effects of select precedents or categories of precedents would
have an irrational effect on how the judicial power is carried into execution. Such a statute would amount to Congress asking the courts to
base theirjudgments on their "best" interpretations of law rather than
to distort them by deferring to the force of precedents they deem incorrect. Asking courts to do their own independent best work is not
obviously irrational.
A more interesting Sweeping Clause objection is that, notwithstanding Congress's acknowledged power to regulate judicial procedure,22'6 congressional regulation of stare decisis norms could not
accomplish a permissible end because it would "improperly" intrude
upon the courts' independent decisionmaking authority, or, to cast
the matter in Marbuiy-type terms, any attempt by Congress to use law
to tell the courts how to interpret other laws would infringe on their
'' 7
power "to say what the law is. 2
224 For earlier discussions of this point, see Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1567-70
(maintaining that Congress has Sweeping Clause power to strip Supreme Court constitutional constructions of their precedential force). Cf Harrison, supra note 18, at
531-39 (contending that Congress has Sweeping Clause power to enact "systemic"
controls on precedential force but balking at Paulsen thesis that this power extends to
targeting disfavored cases); Lawson, supra note 9, at 203-14 (concluding that Sweeping Clause does not authorize congressional regulation of precedential force).
225 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
226 See, e.g.,
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (observing that Congress
has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause "to make rules governing the
practice and pleading in [federal] courts").
227 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (claiming the courts
have the peculiar "province and duty ...to say what the law is"); cf Paulsen, supra
note 20, at 1568 (observing that it cannot be constitutionally "proper" for Congress to
enact laws that "infringe on the autonomous constitutional powers of other
branches").
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An initial problem for this objection is that, as Professor Paulsen
has ably demonstrated, Congress, often with explicit judicial approval,
has regulated in important respects how courts go about determining
facts, applicable law, and remedies for well over 200 years.228 If two

centuries' worth of congressional and judicial practice is any guide,
then broad congressional regulation of judicial operations is commonplace and not, as a category, constitutionally suspect. On this
view, a law releasing the courts from horizontal stare decisis might be
novel, but would not be substantially more intrusive or "improper"
than, for instance, the innumerable statutes that control burdens of
proof and standards of review;2 29 the command of the Full Faith and
Credit Act that federal courts give preclusive effect to state court judgments; 2 3 "' or the Anti-Injunction Act's sharp curtailment of federal

23
court injunctive authority. '
There we might be tempted to let matters stand had not Professor Gary Lawson recently used a critique of Paulsen's analysis as a
springboard for raising fundamental questions concerning the relation of the legislative and judicial departments; his thesis: Congress
may not use its Sweeping Clause authority to substantively regulate
how courts go about finding facts or interpreting law because doing so
would infringe the independence demanded by Article III's judicial
power. 232 As a threshold methodological matter, Lawson observes

228 Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1567-70, 1582-90. Professor Paulsen should be
credited with developing many of the examples of congressional regulation of the
judiciary discussed below. See infra notes 229-31, 252-63.
229 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (requiring courts
to review certain categories of administrative fact-finding under the "substantial evidence" or "arbitrary and capricious" standards).
230 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of
any ...

State, Territory or Possession ...

shall have the same full faith and credit in

every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the court of
such State, Territory, or Possession from which they are taken.").
231 Id. § 2283 (providing that federal courts may only enjoin state court proceedings as authorized by Congress or to protect their jurisdiction or judgments).
232 See generally Lawson, supra note 9 (critiquing and rejecting thesis that Congress
may abrogate stare decisis on the ground that doing so would improperly interfere
with judicial decisional independence). This Article uses Professor Lawson's critique
as its primary foil for exploring congressional power to regulate judicial decisionmaking. For other arguments that Congress may not constitutionally interfere with the
operation of stare decisis in the courts, see James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan,
"Sone Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article lII
Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 837-38 (1998); and Fallon, supra note 25, passim.
Briefly, Professors Liebman and Ryan contend that a primary function of the
federal courts is to ensure the supremacy of federal law and that they may only
achieve this end if their judgments are "effectual," which requires that judicial opin-
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that "there is simply no way to understand . . . the 'executive' and
,judicial' powers or the scope of congressional authority to regulate
the execution of these powers without reference to theoretical backions have stare decisis effects. Liebman & Ryan, supra, at 837-38. It is not clear,
however, why judicial opinions must have horizontal precedential force to enable the
federal courts to ensure federal supremacy. For instance, eliminating the horizontal
force of Supreme Court opinions would not relieve litigants of the duty to obey the
Court's judgments, nor would it release lower federal or state courts from their vertical
obligation to defer to its interpretations of law.
Liebman and Ryan draw indirect support for their argument from the Supreme
Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), which held that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) was unconstitutional. Liebman & Ryan,
supra, at 838; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control ofJurisdiction
and the Future of the Federal Courts-Opposition,Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J.
2445, 2469-70 (1998) (suggesting Boerne may indicate that Congress must allow Article Ill courtjudgments to have "ordinary" stare decisis effects). RFRA was a reaction
to the Court's decision to abandon its interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as
requiring a "compelling state interest" to justify laws imposing substantial burdens on
religious practices. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-13 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)). RFRA sought to reimpose this test pursuant to Congress's remedial
powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 515-17. The Court
rejected this attempt to use section 5 on the ground that RFRA did not represent a
measured, appropriate effort to enforce the Free Exercise Clause's substantive protections; rather it amounted to an attempt to evade the Court's interpretation of them in
Smith. Id. at 532-36. Near the close of its opinion, the majority included the following broad observation:
When the political branches of the Government act against the background
of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare
decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.
Id. at 536. This passage suggests that the Cotrt would look askance at a congressional
attempt to regulate the precedential force of its opinions. Nonetheless, the Court's
primary concern in Boerne was to address the federalism problem of determining
whether Congress had exceeded its section 5 power; this case does not represent a
definitive Supreme Court statement on the subject of the relation of precedent to
separation of powers. See Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified
Judiciary",78 TEX. L. REV. 1513, 1543 n.] 12 (2000) (noting Boerne's focus on federalism and that its separation-of-powers implications are unclear);Jackson, supra,at 2469
(offering similar assessment of Boerne).
Professor Fallon argues that a correct understanding of the proper method of
interpreting the Constitution in light of the sources of its legitimacy rules out any
possibility that Congress may eliminate stare decisis. Fallon, supra note 25, at 585-94.
To oversimplify his argument, he contends that stare decisis should enjoy constitutional status because it is an entrenched, accepted part of our jurisprudence and
makes excellent policy sense. Id. at 582-88. This Article will not attempt to wrestle
with Professor Fallon's subtle analysis except to note, as he himself did, that norms
that earn their constitutional status through "acceptance" may lose that status if we
lose faith in them. Id. at 589-90.
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ground norms about the Constitution's separation of powers. "2 3
Constitutional text by itself cannot do the job-the meaning of the
'judicial power" was neither well-developed nor much-discussed at the
234
time of the framing.
Confronted with such fuzziness, Lawson hangs his doctrinal hat
on the background norm of "decisional independence," which requires that "each department of the national government must be independent of the other departments in its exercise of enumerated
functions unless the Constitution directs otherwise." 23 5 It follows that
Congress may not use laws to affect how the courts find facts or interpret laws.23 6 He explains,
The judicial power of course includes the power to reason to the
outcome of a case. One cannot decide cases without bringing to
bear some decision-making methodology for identifying and applying the relevant facts and law, so a grant of the judicial power must
include a grant of the power to reason from facts and law to conclusions. Can Congress control that reasoning power by using the
Sweeping Clause to dictate the decision-making methodology that
courts must employ? The answer, as an inference from the principle of departmental independence, must be no. The process of decision-making is so tied up with the process of reaching a decision
that it must be the "proper" province of the judicial department in
the same way and to the same degree as the power to reach an outcome. Indeed, it is almost silly to say that the core of the judicial
power is merely the power to reach a result, without reference to
the process by which that result is reached. Accordingly, Congress
can pass substantive laws, but it cannot tell the courts how to iden23 7
tify, construe, and apply them.
233 Lawson, supra note 9, at 200.
234 Id. at 202-03.
235 Id. at 204.
236 The caveat to this proposition is that Lawson allows that Congress's Sweeping
Clause power may "properly" extend to enactment of "procedural" rules. Id. at 224.
He writes that "[p]rocedural rules concerning such matters as forms of pleading,
methods for executing judgments, empanelling ofjuries, etc. are surely precisely the
kinds of laws 'for carrying into Execution' the judicial power that the Sweeping Clause
is designed to authorize." Id. It might sound as if this "procedural" exception threatens to swallow Lawson's proposed rule. This is not the case, however, as he makes
plain that many statutes and rules that some might characterize as safely "procedural,"
for example, standards of review, amount, in his view, to substantive intrusions into
the operation of the judicial power. See id. at 223 (concluding, albeit with "unease,"
that "the bottom line must be that federal statutes that prescribe a standard of proof
for federal courts are per se unconstitutional").

237

Lawson, supra note 9, at 210-11 (emphasis added).

114

2

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 78:4

Lawson therefore concludes that congressional interference with stare
decisis is a non-starter.2 38 In addition, he gleefully traces his argument to the conclusion that the very same statutes (and congressionally authorized rules) that Paulsen cited as historical support for his
proposition that Congress can regulate stare decisis are all in fact constitutionally suspect intrusions on the judiciary's independent
2 39
power.
The most illuminating approach to Lawson's argument is to wrestle with it more or less on its own terms and analyze how much power
Congress should have to regulate the judiciary in light of basic separation-of-powers norms.2'4 He is surely right that one such norm is decisional independence-otherwise, one branch could absolutely control
another and make separation a matter of meaningless form rather
than meaningful function. 24 1 Plainly, there would be something seriously wrong with any theory of separation of powers that would permit
Congress to use its lawmaking powers to force the courts to "interpret"
all references to years in the Constitution as dog-years, thus enabling a
2 42
five-year-old (in human years) to be President.
On the other hand, it is not obvious why one should regard all
congressional regulation of judicial decisionmaking as illegitimate interference given that one of the core purposes of enacting statutes is
to provide rules for deciding cases and controversies, i.e., to limitjudicial discretion. Understood in this light, a law that tells the courts how
to interpret other laws need not be regarded as an infringement on
their power "to say what the law is"; rather, such a (meta)law merely
provides them with more laws to interpret. Put another way, the "decisional independence" norm, by itself, does not provide a sufficient
238 See id. at 211 ("This conclusion straightforwardly rules out a statute regulating
the courts' use of precedent.").
239 See id. at 224-26.
240 For Paulsen's own (very different) response to Lawson, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Lawson's Awesome (Also Wrong, Some), 18 CONST. COMMENT. 231 (2001). He
would no doubt condemn separation-ofpowers analysis in terms of dueling "background norms" as a game fit for "fuzzy-wiizzy... functionalist-pragmatist-balancers."
See id. at 238. Let ten thousand fuzzy-wuzzy flowers bloom.
241 Cf TiE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 167, at 315-16. Madison argued,
It is agreed oil all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of the
departments ought not to be directly and completely administered by either
of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought to
possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the
administration of their respective powers.

Id.
242

Cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (setting minimum age limit of thirty-five years
for the Presidency). Martian,,Jovian, and Venusian years are also right out.
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basis for determining which laws improperly infringe on judicial
power to interpret the laws.
To understand the proper scope of judicial decisional independence, one must turn to the most fundamental separation-of-powers
norm of all-prevention of tyranny through rule of law. 243 Rule of

law requires that law-enforcers-the officials who actually possess the
power to hurt people-find their discretion (zone of arbitrary power)
constrained by law created prior to its application. Congressional regulation of judicial operations is often perfectly consistent with this
rule-of-law value. That such regulations constrain the courts is no objection in itself given that a primary goal of separation of powers is to
constrain the courts (and the executive) with law. By way of stark contrast, an aggressive vision of judicial independence that encourages
courts to strike any laws they might plausibly characterize as regulating their decisionmaking would invite arbitrary, lawlessjudicial action.
The vagueness of the concept of the 'judicial power" magnifies this
danger, and a spate of (remarkable) state supreme court decisions
2 44
demonstrates that it is far more than theoretical.
It is easy to think of hypothetical congressional efforts to regulate
judicial interpretation that seem unproblematic from a rule-of-law
perspective. For example, suppose some "interpretive" statute Y instructs a court how to read some substantive statute X, e.g., Y might
provide that the word "black," as used in X, means "white." Provided
Xand Yare both statutes, it is difficult to see how requiring the courts
to read them together would adversely affectjudicial independence to
interpret the law considered as a whole-it just so happens that the
relevant law in the stated case is composed of both Xand Y. Indeed, to
question-beg for a moment, provided that Congress acted within its
constitutional powers in enacting these laws, the rule of law requires
that the courts enforce them both.
At the risk of sounding tautological, congressional statutes that
instruct the courts how to interpret or implement other laws will only'
pose a rule-of-law problem if they prevent the courts from enforcing
law. If the law were always what Congress says it is; then this result
could not happen. The law is not what Congress says it is, however,
where a statute conflicts with the Constitution, which was designed in
large part to prevent Congress (or anyone else) from seizing tyranni243

See supra notes 157-68 and accompanying text.

244 For an illuminating survey of state supreme courts' unfortunate habit of striking legislation for intruding on their 'judicial power" prerogatives on sometimes astonishingly dubious grounds, see Adrian Vermeinle, The JudicialPower in the State (and
Federal) Courts, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 357, 373-90.
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cal power. It follows that Congress may not properly enact laws that
prevent the courts from interpreting and enforcing the Constitution
in a manner that keeps Congress in its place.
There is no need for a broad proscription of congressional regulation ofjudicial decisionmaking to protect the judicial independence
necessary to enforce the Constitution. One merely needs to recognize
that Congress cannot use lower, statutory law to rewrite the Constitution and therefore cannot use "interpretive" statutes to force the courts
to adopt constitutional constructions they deem incorrect.2 4 5 Thus,
Congress could not get rid of a 60-year-old President by enacting a law
declaring that the term "thirty-five" as used in the Constitution means
"seventy" until the next election. Note that this constitutional "exception" is actually just an application of the general rule in light of the
supremacy of the Constitution: if a court construes together both constitutional provision X and statute Y purporting to force a "wrong"
interpretation of X on the courts, the analysis is simple-statutory Y
has no effect on constitutional X.
An additional obvious limitation on Congress is that it cannot use
its legislative authority to seize for itself the judiciary's power to resolve cases by determining facts and applying law to them.2 4 Although Congress can affect case outcomes indirectly by enacting
(constitutional) laws, it may not, for instance, constitutionally enact a
statute forcing a court in a given case to find that the defendant violated preexisting law and to award the plaintiff one million dollars in
compensation. 247
245 Congress plainly cannot force the courts to adopt interpretations of the Constitution that they deem flat-out wrong. It is less obvious whether Congress could legislate that courts grant something like Chevron deference to congressional
constitutional interpretations. Cf James B. Thayer, The Oigin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARV. L. REv. 129, 144 (1893) (arguing that judicial review should operate subject to a "clear error" rule pursuant to which courts
should set aside statutes only where the legislature "ha[s] not merely made a mistake,
but ha[s] made a very clear one-so clear that it is not open to rational question").
Whether Congress could constitutionally enact some such rule of deference need not
be resolved for present purposes, however, because abrogation of horizontal precedential force would not require the courts to defer to congressional interpretations;
rather, it merely would allow courts to exercise their own independent judgments on
constitutional meaning free from any distorting effects of past decisions.
246 Cf U.S. CONSr. art. III, § I (vesting judicial power in the courts).
247 Of course, the line between a legitimate "law" and an illegitimate legislative
verdict is obscure. Cf Lawson, supra.note 9, at 207 (addressing this point in a discussion of State v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855)). For
instance, suppose that, rather than declare that a plaintiff must win $1 million in a
case because the defendant violated a law already on the books, Congress were instead to enact a statute that retroactively condemned the defendant's conduct and
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These two limitations-that Congress cannot force wrong constitutional interpretations on the courts and cannot exercise the judicial
power to resolve cases itself-work together to prevent Congress from
distorting the Constitution to increase improperly its (or anyone
else's) power. The principle that Congress may not itself resolve cases
prevents it from enforcing distorted, self-serving interpretations of the
Constitution in that context; the principle that the courts are independent interpreters of the Constitution prevents Congress from taking an indirect route to this same end by forcing the courts to accept
such distortions.
Note that, from the point of view of enhancing the rule of law,
this function of ensuring that the legislature remains within constitutional limits is the most critical purpose served by judicial independence from legislative control-as reflection on a separation-ofpowers puzzle demonstrates. The commonly stated danger posed by
legislative seizure ofjudicial power is that such a coup would leave the
resolution of litigants' cases subject to the legislature's "arbitrary" control.2 48 If, however, a legislature has sovereign power to make up any
arbitrary laws that it likes, and the rule of law requires that the courts
enforce these laws, then it is not so clear that granting the legislature
an additional 'judicial" power to arbitrarily apply the arbitrary laws it
made up in the first place would substantially increase its power to oppress. Impartial application of arbitrary, oppressive laws may be of
small comfort to those on the receiving end of them. The Constitution has a simple answer to this puzzle-Congress does not enjoy sovereign lawmaking power but instead may only legislate pursuant to its
enumerated powers as limited by various provisions designed to prevent oppression; for example, Congress may not enact bills of attainimposed $1 million in liability for it. Bona fide "law" or illegitimate "verdict"? An
attempt to draw this line is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice for the moment
to note, however: (1) the courts, as independent interpreters of the Constitution,
have the power to draw this line and thus block congressional usurpations of the
judicial power; and (2) the Constitution itself ameliorates the problem that Congress

will attempt to enact laws that improperly target and oppress individuals by proscribing bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
248 See, e.g.,
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211, 241 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("For one thing, the authoritative application of a general law to a particular
case by an independent judge, rather than by the legislature itself, provides an assur-

ance that even an unfair law at least will be applied evenhandedly according to its
terms."); 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 163, at 163 ("Again, there is no liberty, if the
judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were .it
joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control .... ).
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der or ex post facto laws. 249 Given these limits on Congress's
lawmaking power, the danger of granting it the power to apply the
Constitution to resolve cases is plain-given the chance, it would ignore or distort the constitutional limits on its powers were it to be2
come the judge of their scope.

511

Subject to the proviso that Congress may not use its lawmaking

power in a way that enables it to evade the courts' power to enforce
constitutional limitations, one may regard legislative control of judicial operations as quite a good thing-the lawmaker is supposed to use
law to channel enforcement discretion in a separation-of-powers system. By contrast, permitting courts to strike as unconstitutional any
laws they could plausibly characterize as regulating their decisionmaking processes would undermine rather than enhance the rule of law.
Many statutes and rules could be characterized as congressional
efforts to regulate activities that are in some respect fundamental to
the operation of the judicial power to resolve cases and controversies. 2 5' 1 Consider the omnipresence of standards of review that control
judicial fact-finding. Section 706 of the APA requires that courts affirm agency fact-finding that, depending on the context, is either supported by "substantial evidence" or is not "arbitrary and capricious;"

numerous agency organic statutes contain similar standards.2 5 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which Congress authorized after a
fashion through the Rules Enabling Act, 2 53 provides that district court
249

U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
As Hamilton put the matter,
The complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential in
a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which
contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for
instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the
like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of courts ofjustice, whose duty it must be to declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all
the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 497; see also id. at 498 (rejecting the notion
"that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers"; countering that one of the functions of the courts is "to keep the [legislature]
within the limits assigned to their authority").
251 See Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1582-90 (discussing examples of congressional
regulation of judicial operations).
252 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); 29 U.S.C.
§ 660(a) (providing that factual findings of OSHRC, "if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive").
253 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074 (2000) (providing lawmaking
250

mechanism for Supreme Court to promulgate-subject to congressional approval-

procedural rules of court).
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findings of fact must be affirmed provided that they are not "clearly
erroneous."' 2

54

A similar statutory standard applies to district court re-

view of certain magistrate judge determinations..2 5 5 Such deferential
standards of review represent a legislative policy judgment that, over
the run of cases, they are beneficial because they enhance respect for
initial decisionmakers, promote finality, and reduce the risk of error
5
by reviewing courts.2 1

Of course, to the degree the Federal Rules of Evidence can be
laid at Congress's door-via its passive approval of some rules through
the Rules Enabling Act or its direct legislation of others-they represent a massive legislative intrusion into the judicial world of
2 57
factfinding.
The Full Faith and Credit Act, enacted in 1790, provides an especially ancient example of intrusive congressional regulation ofjudicial
operations. 25 8 It commands federal courts to grant state court judgments the same preclusive effects as they receive in the courts that
render them. 259 Doing so requires federal courts, in appropriate

cases, to adopt state court findings of fact and interpretations of
law.2 1111 In a sense, the Act thus imposes a decisionmaking process-

on occasion federal courts must accept somebody else's fact-finding
and legal interpretations rather than decide for themselves how to
conduct these tasks. Moreover, before a federal court can give effect
254 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact.., shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court tojudge
of the credibility of the witnesses.").

255

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

256

See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-76 (1985) (stating ratio-

nales for FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
257 For a brief summary of congressional efforts to rewrite the Federal Rules of
Evidence, see Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking", 53
HASTINGS L.J. 843, 853-56 (2002). Rules 413-15, which govern admission of the past
sexual conduct of defendants in sexual assault cases, provide an excellent recent ex-

ample of this practice; Congress added them to the Federal Rules of Evidence as part

of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 320935, 108 Stat. 1796, 2135-2137 (1994).
258 See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.

259 28 U.S.C. § 1738 ("The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any
...State, Territory or Possession ...shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States ...as they have by law or usage in the courts of such
State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.").

260 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When [1] an issue of
fact or law is [2] actually litigated and determined by [3] a valid and final judgment,
and [4] the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different
claim.").

1148

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 78:4

to a state courtjudgment, it must first figure out what is in it. The Act
regulates this process as well, designating by statute what evidence
counts for "proving" and "admitting" state court records.2 6 1
Some have suggested that the power to fashion remedies is an
integral part of the judicial power. 2 62 Many statutes control judicial
remedies. Since 1793, the Anti-Injunction Act has sharply limited federal court power to enjoin state court proceedings. 2 63 Many state legislatures have capped punitive damages for common-law causes of
action. 264 Congress attempted to enact such a cap for product liability
actions but was foiled by President Clinton's veto. 265 Given that
Republicans now control both houses of Congress and the executive
branch, it seems likely that similar efforts at "tort reform" may soon
266
become federal law.

Courts commonly describe their contempt power as an "inherent" part of theirjudicial power.2" 7 The need for law to limit arbitrary
261 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (providing that records of state court proceedings shall be
proven by means of clerk's attestation, seal, and judge's certificate); cf. Lawson, supra
note 9, at 218-19 (admitting that provision "specifying the manner in which the applicable law must be proved" represents a "founding-era example of congressional regulation ofjudicial decision-making").
262 See Engdahl, supra note 195, at 170 (observing that "[s]urely 'remedy' is the
most fundamental and essential element of judicial power... [g]iving relief as deemed
appropriateby the courts is an inherent and indispensable part of the federal judicial
power"); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and
not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish
no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.").
263 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 provides a more
recent example of congressional regulation of equitable remedies. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(b) (2) (requiring the lifting of prison injunctions in the absence of certain
statutorily required findings).
264 See generally BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614-19 (1996) (Ginsburg,J.,
dissenting) (collecting in an appendix information regarding state legislative reforms
of punitive damages, including caps).
265 The Common Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th
Cong. (1995), would have capped products liability punitive damages awards at the
greater of twice compensatory damages or $250,000 in actions against companies
worth more than $500,000.
266 John D. McKinnon, Bush To Seek Curbs on Legal Costs, WALL ST.J., Nov. 27, 2002,
at A5 (discussing likelihood of congressional action to cap medical malpractice and
punitive damages awards).
267 See, e.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chi., St. Paul, Minn. & Omaha Ry.
Co., 266 U.S. 42 (1924). The Court observed,
That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts, has been
many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is essential to the
administration ofjustice. The courts of the United States, when called into

2003]

HORIZONTAL

FORCE

OF PRECEDENT

1149

discretion is at its very peak where the power to punish is concerned.
Contempt law therefore presents a real separation-of-powers problem.
Left unchecked, this power permits courts to define offending conduct, adjudicate whether it has occurred, and determine an appropriate punishment or harsh "civil" remedy.2 68 That it is dangerous to
give courts plenary power to determine how to hurt those who somehow offend them should be obvious. In any event, Congress has regulated the contempt power by statute since 1789.269
Standards of review, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Federal
Rules of Evidence, the Anti-Injunction Act, caps on damages, and regulation of the contempt power: all of these laws affect how the courts
find facts, determine law, or fashion remedies of one sort or another.
An especially aggressive Lawsonian court might therefore strike them
as impermissible intrusions into the operation of the judicial
power.2 70 None of these laws, however, seem to amount to congressional usurpationsof enforcement power that could endanger impartial administration of the rule of law-they are just more laws to
enforce.
On the other hand, granting courts plenary control over how
they go about resolving cases would naturally tend to increase rather
than constrain their zone of arbitrary power. It would in essence create a vague zone of 'judicial power" immunity from the rule of law. Of
course, if the Constitution clearly granted the courts such a zone by
virtue of vesting the 'judicial power" in them, one could not trump
this grant with separation-of-powers "background norms." Here, however, we are trying to determine if the 'judicial power" should be conexistence and vested with jurisdiction over any subject, at once became possessed of the power.
Id. at 65-66.
268 Cf Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 822 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("In light of the broad sweep of modern judicial decrees,
which have the binding effect of laws for those to whom they apply, the notion of
judges' [sic] in effect making the laws, prosecuting their violation, and sitting in judgment of those prosecutions, summons forth ... vividly.., the prospect of 'the most
tyrannical licentiousness."' (citing Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228

(1821))).
269 See id. at 821 (noting that Congress "conferred" contempt power on the courts
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, sec. 17, 1 Stat. 83); see also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2000)
(criminalizing contempt).

270 For Lawson's own analysis of the validity of various statutes under the standard
he proposes, see supra note 9, at 219-26. Compare with Vermeule, supra note 244, at
359-60, 373-90 (extensively documenting state supreme courts' invocation of their
exclusive control over 'judicial power" to justify invalidating legislative regulation of,.
inter alia, standards of review, rules of evidence, contempt power, and damages caps).
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strued as a grant of such immunity and, in this context, it is certainly
worth pondering whether too broad a construction of judicial independence might have the effect of granting an uncomfortable
amount of uncontrolled, arbitrary power to appointed law-enforcement officials with life tenure and salary guarantees.
The state court systems form fifty natural laboratories that illustrate the threat to the rule of law posed by courts that too eagerly
invoke a fuzzy 'judicial power" immunity (under their state constitutions) to be free of legislative interference. In an illuminating study of
this practice, Professor Vermeule documents that state supreme
courts, pursuant to what he calls "the paranoid style of American judicial review," have indicated that legislatures intrude on judicial prerogatives by, inter alia: altering common-law liability rules and
remedies; regulating the contempt power; enacting standards of review, rules of evidence, or other procedural rules; or failing to grant
27
the judiciary as much funding as a court determines it requires. 1
Vermeule concludes, quite persuasively, that such decisions "sweep be2 72
yond any defensible conception of judicial power."
Two recent instances of judicial interference with major legislative tort reform efforts provide excellent examples of this sort of unjustified 'judicial power" overreach into the political realm. The
Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, among other reforms, imposed a $500,000 limit on "non-economic" compensatory
damages for pain and suffering.2 73 One can make policy arguments
either way for such a rule-for example, one might argue that judges
and juries should decide such damages on a fact-specific basis, or, alternatively, one might argue that pain-and-suffering damages are ad
hoc attempts to monetize what cannot be meaningfully measured in
dollars, and should not be permitted to drive litigation and insurance
costs. In any event, the constitutionality of this cap was challenged in
Best v. Taylor Machine Works. 274 Following the usual dance in constitu-

tional cases, the Illinois Supreme Court nominally eschewed policy
analysis.2 75 It then took the remarkable step of striking the cap for
violating separation of powers and for intruding on the court's exclu-

See Vermeule, supra note 244, at 359-60.
Id. at 360.
273 735 ILL. ComP.STr. ANN. § 5/2-1115.1 (West Supp. 1996), held unconstitutional
by Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (Il1. 1997).
274 Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1057.
275 Id. at 1063 ("We recognize that we should not and need not balance the advan271
272

tages and disadvantages of reform.").
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common-law procedure courts use to reduce damages awards they
deem so grossly excessive as to "shock the judicial conscience.."27 7 Ap-

plication of remittitur requires a court to exercise vast discretion to
determine how large an award it can tolerate and then to give the
winning plaintiff a choice between accepting that award in lieu of the
jury's verdict or proceeding to a new trial on damages. 278" The legislature's procrustean cap offended separation of powers because it "unduly encroache[d] upon the fundamentally judicial prerogative of
determining whether a jury's assessment of damages is excessive
within the meaning of the law."2 7- The court's explanation for why

remittitur was "fundamental" enough to deserve constitutional status
on a separation-of-powers theory was unclear, to put the matter
mildly.281

In any event, the upshot was that the Illinois Supreme Court invoked separation of powers to prevent the legislature from displacing
common-law judicial discretion (of a kind that many deem arbitrary)
with a bright-line rule of law (albeit a controversial one). Given that a
primary purpose of separation of powers is to constrain the discretion
of executive and judicial officials with law, this result is ironic. From a
rule-of-law point of view, Best has nothing to recommend it.
The Ohio Supreme Court was not to be outdone. In the astonishing State ex rel. Ohio Academy of TrialLawyers v. Sheward, it struck down a
major tort reform package for violating separation of powers by
trenching on the judicial power-among a litany of other state-consti-

276

Id. at 1078-81. In addition, the court struck the cap for violating the "special

legislation" clause of the state constitution. Id. at 1069-78.
277 Id. at 1079 (citing Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621 (111. 1997)).
278 See id. at 1080 (discussing remittitur mechanism).
279 Id.
280 See id. at 1079-81. The court based its decision on a mix of factors, including:
a long "tradition" ofjudicial remittitur; remittitur makes good policy sense; and, perhaps most nonsensically, a legislative cap on damages "undercuts the power, and obligation, of the judiciary to reduce excessive verdicts." Id. at 1080. In addition, the
court found persuasive certain dicta in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash.
1989). In that case, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that a damages cap
might violate separation of powers because it amounted to a form of "legislative 'remittitur,"' which was impermissible because a legislature cannot make the case-bycase determinations necessary to assess damages. Id. at 721 (cited with approval by
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080-81). Of course, the whole point of a legislative cap is to
supercede judicial, case-by-case determinations with law.
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tutional sins. 28 ' The Ohio legislature and courts have struggled over
tort reform for a number of years; the court had struck earlier legislative efforts to impose statutes of repose and require judges rather than
juries to determine punitive damages awards. 282 The legislature responded by enacting a comprehensive statute which, inter alia, again
imposed various statutes of repose and capped punitive damages and
certain categories of compensatory damages as well. The legislature
acknowledged that some of its efforts were inconsistent with judicial
83
precedents, but that it "respectfully disagree [d]" with them. 2
As a matter of constitutional analysis, the court might have chosen to invalidate the law by reaffirming and elaborating upon the
precedents with which the legislature had "respectfully disagree[d]."
Instead, it opined that the very act of enacting a statute which disagrees
with a judicial constitutional construction violates separation of powers!
In the court's view, the legislature, by passing laws that contradicted
precedents, had "usurp[ed the] court's constitutional authority by refusing to recognize [its] holdings,"'8 4 and had attempted to make itself the "final arbiter of the validity of its own legislation."' 28 5 Given
that the new law was subject to judicial review, this assertion was plain
28 6
nonsense.
A constitutional rule proscribing legislative regulation of judicial
decisionmaking processes would create a severe danger of further en-

couraging courts to invoke their vague 'judicial power" prerogatives
to protect or expand their range of arbitrary power with little in the
way of countervailing rule-of-law benefits. This danger is in obvious
tension with the separation-of-powers goal of imposing legal controls
281 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999). The tone of this opinion is captured by the
subtitle with which it begins, "Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350 [the tort reform law] Converts
the Drive for Civil Justice Reform into an Attack on the Judiciary as a Coordinate
Branch of Government." Id. at 1071.
282 See id. at 1072 n.5 (collecting numerous cases in which court had struck tort
reform statutes as unconstitutional, and citing, inter alia, Cyrus v. Henes, 640 N.E.2d
810 (Ohio 1994) (striking statute of repose); and Zoppo v. Homestead Insurance Co., 644
N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994) (striking statute that assigned determination of punitive
damages to court rather than jury)).
283 See, e.g., Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1086 (quoting the legislature's deferential
apology).
284 Id.
285 Id. at 1096.
286 And also just a plain bad idea. As Professor Vermeule observes, the rule of Best
"would prevent a court from ever changing its past constitutional rulings on the validity of legislation ... because the legislature would be constitutionally barred from
supplying the reenactment needed to provide a case or controversy in which the reconsideration could occur." Vermeule, supra note 244, at 389.
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on the discretion of the enforcers. While it is true that separation of
powers also seeks to prevent Congress from seizing enforcement powers which would enable it to distort and apply law arbitrarily, congressional efforts to regulate the judiciary do not as a class pose any such
threat.
In light of these concerns and in the absence of determinate text,
the better understanding of the Sweeping Clause's interaction with
the judicial power is that congressional regulation ofjudicial decision-

making does not "improperly" infringe upon judicial independence
unless it enables Congress to block the courts from effectively using

the Constitution as a checking device, e.g., Congress may not force
the courts to adopt congressionally favored constitutional interpretations they deem incorrect, and it may not sidestep the courts completely by seizing their power to decide individual cases. This
standard leaves ample room for Congress to dispose of the horizontal
force of many precedents or categories of precedents. This claim
may, at first blush, seem problematic because subjecting constitutional
precedents to such treatment would permit Congress to affectjudicial
constitutional interpretation. It would not do so in a way offensive to
separation of powers, however, because asking courts to implement
their best, independentjudgments when interpreting the law could not
force them to adopt congressionally favored constructions of the Constitution (or any other law, for that matter). 28 7 A court would remain
287 Some scholars have argued or suggested that such preservation ofjudicial interpretive independence cannot save the constitutionality of selective abrogation of
stare decisis because Congress would presumably exercise this power to expand the
courts' discretion with an eye toward affecting substantive doctrine. See Fallon, supra
note 25, at 595 (condemning notion that Congress may manipulate precedent to
"skew the substantive outcome ofjudicial deliberations"); Harrison, supra note 18, at
531-32 (observing that it would be illicit for Congress "[t]o adopt or apply a rule of
precedent in order to reach a doctrinal result"); cf.Caminker, supra note 232, at 1545
n.120 (suggesting that congressional manipulation of precedential force to affect doctrine might violate separation of powers). But see Paulsen, supra note 20, at 1596-97
(abrogating stare decisis would not impair judicial power because it would leave
courts free to decide cases "on the merits"). They are no doubt correct if one starts
from the premise that Congress has no constitutional authority to attempt to influence judicial constitutional constructions in any manner whatsoever-no matter how
noncoercive. In a republic that counts majority rule as one of its core values, however, it would seem logical to consider the alternative, "qualified majoritarian" premise that the popular branches should be able to participate in constitutional
interpretation to the degree they can do so without unduly undermining the power of
the courts to use the Constitution to hold them in check. Both of these premises lead
to one fundamental conclusion to which all agree: plainly, Congress cannot force the
courts to adopt "wrong" constitutional interpretations that Congress favors, for then
the Constitution could not control Congress. The qualified-majoritarian premise,
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perfectly free to affirm a precedent based on its inherent persuasive
value. Nor would such a statute enable Congress to usurp the judicial
power of resolving case outcomes-a law which expands rather than
contractsjudicial options cannot be a means for Congress to concentrate arbitrary power in itself.
Thus, as discussed earlier, from the point of view of Sweeping
Clause and separation-of-powers analyses, the only danger that would
be posed by a statute that eliminated the horizontal stare decisis force
of precedents would be that it might effectively delegate legislative
rather than judicial discretion to the courts in some extreme context.
Such an overreaching statute could not fairly be said to "carry into
execution" the 'judicial power." Subject to this caveat, Congress may,
consistent with separation of powers, grant considerable discretion to
the courts and may, pursuant to the Sweeping Clause, "properly" increase this discretion by eliminating the coercive effects of many
precedents.
III.

BACK TO ANASTASOFF: CONGRESS COULD LEGITIMIZE THE
NONPRECEDENT RUI.ES

We are now ready to trek back to Anastasoff and reassess the constitutional implications of Eighth Circuit Rule 28(A)(i), which purported to authorize appellate panels to issue select opinions as
"nonprecedents" that later panels of the same court were free to ignore.288 As Judge Richard Arnold put the matter:
At bottom, rules like our Rule 28A(i) assert that courts have the
following power: to choose for themselves, from among all the cases
they decide, those that they will follow in the future, and those that
they need not. Indeed, some forms of the non-publication rule
even forbid citation. Those courts are saying to the bar: "We may
have decided this question the opposite way yesterday, but this does
however, leaves room for stare-decisis-stripping statutes, which would not force constitutional constructions on the courts and therefore would not rob them of their ability
to check Congress, but at the same time would modestly (?) expand the congressional
voice in the process of constitutional construction. If it is correct that Congress
should be able to exercise stIch limited, noncoercive influence on judicial constittional interpretation, then the Sweeping Clause could offer an avenue to exercise that
influence: where Congress disagrees with a judicial constitutional construction, abrogating its horizontal precedential force would amount to a "necessary" (reasonable)
and "proper" (permissible) enactment for "carrying into execution" (improving the
operation of) the judicial power. For a discussion of the normative implications of
increasing the popular voice in constitutional construction, see infra Part IV.
288 See generally Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-905 (8th Cir. 2000)
(surveying history of the precedent doctrine), vacaled as moot on reh'g en banc, 235 F.3d
1054 (8th Cir. 2000). For the fill text of Rule 28(A)(i), see supra note 100.
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not bind us today, and, what's more, you cannot even tell us what
we did yesterday." As we have tried to explain in this opinion, such
a statement exceeds the judicial power, which is based on reason,
2 89
not fiat.

He concluded that "the portion of Rule 28A(i) that declares that unpublished opinions are not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, because it purports to confer on the federal courts a power
that goes beyond the judicial.' "290
This conclusion relies on a strained and narrow understanding of
the meaning of 'judicial power." Even if one grants that the Framers'
understanding of that term should be binding now, it seems implausible to suggest that they silently believed that its definition necessarily
entailed adherence to the common law's doctrine of precedent, in
light of Blackstone's discussion of legal systems that failed to follow
this same approach. 2 'I Nor, on reflection, is it plausible to maintain
that separation of powers demands that every judicial opinion, no matter how trivial, command precedential force to prevent courts from
292
wielding "arbitrary" or "legislative" discretion.
Judge Arnold was correct, however, to sense an important link
between separation of powers and the fundamental role that respect
for precedent played in the common-law courts of the ex-colonies
around the time of the founding. According to the dominant "declaratory theory" of that day, precedents were "evidence" of law that
courts should follow absent an affirmative showing of unreasonableness. 293- There can be, of course, no constitutional requirement that
twenty-first century judges adopt this jurisprudence asa matter of personal belief-the Constitution does not tell judges that they must "believe" that their opinions are "evidence" of law. Abandonment of the
conceptual trappings of the declaratory theory, however, does not require or authorize the courts to abandon the fundamental limitation
on their discretion that carne along with it-their legal obligation to
show measured respect for their own precedents. Indeed, courts cannot-consistent with separation of powers and rule of law-increase
289 Anastasoff 223 F.3d at 904.
290 Id. at 899.
291 See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
292 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing application of nondelegation doctrine (or a
close cousin) to stare-decisis-stripping statutes); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d
1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within
Article IIIof the Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and orders issued by appellate courts be binding authority.").
293 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.A.
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their discretionary power beyond that granted by law.29 4 Therefore,
although the definition of the 'judicial power" does not preclude issuance of "nonprecedents," the nonprecedent rules are unconstitutional if they amount to an unauthorized power grab by the courts.
Clearly, the Supreme Court would run afoul this principle were
it, for example, to declare that henceforth it would disregard all of its
First Amendment jurisprudence, for doing so would radically expand
its discretion to decide cases implicating this amendment going forward. Anyjudicial attempt to strip the precedential force from a case
that states a new, important principle of law would also seem
problematic.
In theory, however, the nonprecedent rules are supposed to alleviate judicial burdens by speeding relatively trivial cases through the
system. If a case is genuinely trivial, then, by definition, it cannot impose new precedential limits on the courts. It arguably follows that
stripping such cases of their precedential force on issuance should not
amount to an impermissible power grab.
The preceding view unduly minimizes the importance of the nonprecedent rules and their effects on judicial operations. For one
thing, sometimes courts make what are presumably mistakes and categorize cases as nonprecedents even though they are actually cases of
first impression within their circuit. Indeed, the Anastasoffpanel opinion only came into being because the court found itself wrestling with
the problem of determining the precedential force of a "nonprecedent" that happened to be a case of first impression within the
Eight Circuit. 295 Moreover, quite aside from evident "mistakes," circuit courts dump large percentages of the cases they decide into the
nonprecedent category; 2- 6 erasing the force of thousands of opinions

per year must leave courts with more decisional maneuvering room
than they would possess if all of them functioned as precedents. In

short, the nonprecedent rules enable the courts to exercise more
power, and it is at least doubtful whether courts could properly authorize them of their own volition in light of the no-power-grabs
principle.
Congress, not the courts, is the proper source of increases injudicial discretionary authority. As discussed above, it may strip cases of
their horizontal precedential force and, on the face of the matter,
294 See supra Part ll.B.
295 See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
296 Hart, 266 F.3d at 1177 (discussing heavy dependence of circuit courts on nonprecedent rules, and noting that only twenty percent of all federal appellate court
decisions are "published").
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there is no reason why it could not delegate a measure of this power
to the courts as a means of improving judicial administration. Perhaps it already has: the Eighth Circuit, like other circuits, promulgated its rule regarding the precedential status of unpublished
opinions pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.2 9 7 This Act delegates

authority to circuit courts to promulgate local rules subject to the limitations that they must not alter any "substantive rights" and must be
consistent with congressional legislation and the general rules of practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court.298 Provided the

nonprecedent rules satisfy these requirements, Congress has, technically speaking, given its permission for them.
In any event, regardless of whether the nonprecedent rules fall
within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has the power to
remove any separation-of-powers clouds that may hover over them.
The theoretical separation-of-powers limitation on congressional atthority to eliminate horizontal stare decisis effects is that Congress
must not grant arbitrary discretion to the courts in violation of the
nondelegation doctrine. 299 The circuit courts' nonprecedent rules
pose no such threat as they only authorize courts to deprive cases of
precedential effect on issuance, and it is difficult to see how such prospective action could create a nondelegation problem. To maintain
such an argument, one would need to contend that designating opinion X as a nonprecedent on its issuance would either: (1) enable a
court to exercise unconstitutionally vast discretion when later deciding case Y raising the same issue; or (2) enable a court to exercise
such discretion when deciding case X itself because it would not need
to worry about the potential distorting effects of its opinion on later
cases. Neither claim seems plausible.
Claim (1) depends on the premise that the narrowing effects of
opinion X as a precedent could ratchet judicial discretion from unconstitutional to acceptable levels in some later case Y raising the
same legal issue. The most basic objection to this argument is that
opinion X could not enjoy precedential force until after it was decided. Therefore, the Y court could only have constitutionally excessive discretion if the X court exercised such discretion first. To say the
least, this condition is extremely unlikely to hold given the state of the

297 Every circuit has promulgated a rule that limits, to one degree or another, the
precedential effects of unpublished opinions. For a table setting forth these rules, see
Serfass & Cranford, supra note 33, at 253-57.
298
299

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071 (a), 2072(a), (b) (2000).
See supra Part II.C.1.
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nondelegation doctrine..11 Even more to the point, it makes little
sense to try to save the constitutionality of Yby insisting that unconstitutional X must function as a precedent."" '
Claim (2) is even weaker. Certainly, the ability to issue nonprecedents affects judicial incentives-courts can work more quickly
and less carefully on opinions that they know will have less effect on
other cases in the future.3 1 Circuit court opinions, however, are public documents; they are easily available online regardless of their
"precedential" or "publication" status, and they are subject to en banc
or Supreme Court review (albeit not in many cases as a practical matter). In light of such constraints, a court cannot exercise arbitrary
discretion when deciding a case merely because it could choose to
issue its opinion as a nonprecedent

11 3

In sum, Judge Arnold was right to claim that the doctrine of precedent has separation-of-powers implications for Rule 28(A) (i) (and
its fellows in other circuits) but wrong about their nature. The federal
courts cannot release themselves from the stare decisis obligations
with which they started. Congress, however, can, and it possesses the
power to legitimize the circuit courts' nonprecedent rules.

300 See supra notes 175-84 and accompanying text (sketching contours of nondelegation doctrine).
301 The Supreme Court made essentially this same point in Whitman, in which it
observed that it was nonsensical to suggest that an agency could "cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power" by providing the necessary limiting standards itself as the act of providing such standards would itself violate the
nondelegation doctrine. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473 (2001).
For a discussion of the implications of Whitman for "curative" effects of limiting judicial statutory constructions on improperly broad delegations, see supra notes 210-15
and accompanying text.
302 Cf. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177-78 (9th Cir. 2001) ("An unpublished disposition is ...a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts, announcing the result and the essential rationale of the ...decision. Deciding a large
portion of our cases in this fashion frees us to spend the requisite time drafting precedential opinions in the remaining cases.").
303 See id. at 1177 n.35 ("Sufficient restrictions on judicial decisionmaking exist to
allay fears of irresponsible and unaccountable practices such as 'burying' inconvenient decisions through nonpublication"); Stephen L. Wasby, UnpublishedDecisions in
the Federal Couils of Appeals: Making the Decision To Publish, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
325, 340-41 (2001) (reviewing Ninth Circuit publication procedures and norms and
concluding that "judges do not make decisions not to publish absent-mindedly," and
"keep each other in line by asking questions, reminding each other of the guidelines,
and discussing the issue collectively").
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BRIEF NORMATIVE RUMINATION ON EXPANDING CONGRESS'S
ROLE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVERSATION

The least radical implication of the conclusion that Congress may
eliminate the horizontal precedential force of (many) judicial opinions is that it could, if it chose, legitimize circuit court nonprecedent
rules. The most radical is that Congress could, as Paulsen suggests,
strip such force from the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations. Congress could not, by asking the Court to implement its best,
independent interpretation of the Constitution free from the distorting effects of earlier decisions, force the Court to adopt a congressionally favored construction. Thus, freeing the Court from the law of
stare decisis even in this targeted fashion should not unduly trench
4 Still, some
on its power to "say what the [constitutional] law is."3 11
may find it wildly implausible, not to mention deeply troubling, to
suggest that Congress may exercise even so passive a role in that
process.
By way of ameliorating this concern: not everyone has always held
the view that courts should be the sole creators and controllers of
precedents. ForJames Madison, an interpretation of law did not have
to flow out of a judicial pen to bear precedential weight-congressional, executive, state, and popular judgments could count in this
regard, too. He made this point in a letter to President Monroe, in
which he contrasted the weakness of precedents supporting the constitutionality of road-building legislation with the strength of those
supporting the Bank of the United States:
As a precedent, the case is evidently without the weight allowed to
that of the National Bank, which had been often a subject of solemn
discussion in Congress, had long engaged the critical attention of
the public, and had received reiterated and elaborate sanctions of
every branch of the Government; to all which had been superadded
many positive concurrences of the States, and implied ones by the peo3 5

ple at large. 0
304
305

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, supra note 4, in 3 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 55-56 (second emphasis added). Of course, in
keeping with declaratory theory, not all such precedents are entitled to equal evidentiary weight. See id., in 3 LETTERS AND OTrH-ER WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 55-56 (noting
that acts of Congress and Executive should not be invoked as precedents unless they
were subject to careful consideration); Letter from James Madison to Judge Roan
(May 6,1821), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 217, 221 (observing
that many congressional decisions are not subject to "fill examination and deliberation" and that such "midnight precedents ... ought to have little weight in any case").
It may also bear noting in this regard that Madison expected that, due to the nature
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In this same vein, in addition to offering the standard rationale that
obedience to precedents enhances the stability of the law,3 "" Madison
also argued that they should be followed
[b]ecause an exposition of the law publicly made, and repeatedly
confirmed by the constituted authority, carries with it, by fair infer-

ence, the sanction of those who, having made the law through their
legislative organ, appear, under such circumstances, to have deter3117
mined its meaning through their judiciary organ.
In other words, precedents declare the will of the people-the ultimate
source of governing authority."x
This Madisonian take on precedent does not license the majority
to rewrite the Constitution (or any other law) as it pleases because,
although precedents may "expound" or "fix" interpretation of a law,
they may not "repeal" or "alter" it. 1'1 Thus, no precedent has the
power to force an unreasonable construction of the law on any court.
This broad approach does acknowledge, however, that majoritarian
institutions have a role to play in choosing among reasonable interpretations of the Constitution. On this view, the process of "fixing"
and "liquidating" the Constitution should be a sort of great conversation among the various branches of the government and the governed. Abandonment of declaratory theory, however, leaves no
conceptual room for nonjudicial constructions to play the role
Madison envisioned as "evidence" of legal meaning-after all, if judicial opinions do not constitute such "evidence," then neither can anybody else's.
Acknowledging a legislative power to free the Court from the coercive force of targeted precedents could provide an alternative doctrinal framework for legitimizing a congressional role in such a
constitutional conversation. No doubt, given Congress's nature, its
participation would be messy and often far from edifying as its memofjudicial operations, "[w]ithout losing sight .. of the co-ordinate relations of the
three departments to each other, it may always be expected that the judicial bench,
when happily filled, will . . . most engage the respect and reliance of the public as the
surest expositor of the Constitution." Unaddressed Letter from James Madison
(1834), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS, suprl note 1, at 349, 350.
306 Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll, supra note 84, in MIND
OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 84, at 390.

307 1(., in MIND OF TEn. FOUNDER, supra note 84, at 390.
308 See Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist, supra note 1, in 4 LETTERS AND
OThER WRITINC'S, supra note 1, at 211 (stating that "in the case of a Constitution as of

a law, a course of authoritative, deliberate, and continued decisions, such as the bank
could plead, was an evidence of the publicjudgment, necessarily superseding individual
opinions" (emphasis added)).
309

Id., in 4 LETI-ERS AND OTHER

WRrINGS,

sulma note 1, at 211.
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bers push for political advantage, but its voice could also prove beneficial. Legal principles do not offer clear, determinate answers to many
of the constitutional issues that reach the Court; often, the law can
only fuzzily define a range of reasonable outcomes. To state the obvious, the Court's choice of an outcome within this range of reason
frequently has a strong political element. The ultimate authority and
legitimacy of all governmental institutions rest at some level on the
will of the governed, albeit as mediated by the rule of law. At the spot
where rule of law more or less runs out (i.e., within the zone of reasonable interpretation), it makes sense that the law-interpreter should
consider the will of the governed. Sometimes the Court expressly admits to doing so-for instance, it purports to base its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on "evolving standards of decency" and to rely on
state legislative judgments as the best source of objective information
concerning those standards.""' No doubt the Court's finger to the
popular wind affects its judgment in many other contexts both on
conscious and not-so-conscious levels. As flawed a vessel as it may be
for this purpose, Congress, by opining directly on the more controversial constitutional issues of the day, could provide information to the
Court concerning that will-which the Court would be free to accept
or reject as it chose.
The increasingly legislative role of the modern Supreme Court
provides a further justification for expanding Congress's role in the
constitutional conversation to some degree. One of the reasons for
leaving constitutional interpretation to the courts is that, as Hamilton
wrote in The Federalist No. 78, they exercise 'judgment" rather than
"will.
It is the nature of legislative and executive officials to seek to
achieve policy ends, and there is always the danger that their "will" to
do so may pollute their legal judgments-we all have the tendency to
confabulate rationalizations that permit us to do what we want anyway.
The courts' passive role as arbiters of legal controversies that litigants
bring to them (whether the courts like it or not) minimizes this danger of "will" tainting 'judgment." The modern Supreme Court, however, is anything but passive. It grants certiorari to a small handful of
the thousands of requests it receives each year. The Court controls its
"

310 See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002) (observing that the Eighth
Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society" and that "the clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures" (citations omitted)).
311 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 75, at 496.
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agenda and is, in this sense, inevitably "activist."' 1 2 This shift in the
Court's nature magnifies its political aspect and weakens the case for
the proposition that any political influence exercised by the other
branches on the Court's interpretive processes must be illegitimate.
Acknowledging a congressional power to eliminate the stare decisis effects of targeted cases on Supreme Court decisionmaking could
spark a vigorous new kind of constitutional conversation that could
increase the role of the popular will in constitutional interpretation
without unduly intruding on the judiciary's power to invoke the Constitution to check other governmental authorities. One can only speculate concerning the ultimate and perhaps unexpected effects of
adopting such a practice, which would require acceptance of a new
understanding of the relations among Congress, the Court, and the
Constitution. Perhaps it bears noting in this regard that mutations
tend to be dangerous. Nonetheless, given that this practice could not
force the Court to adopt any constitutional interpretation it deemed
unreasonable, it is not obvious that its effects would be illegitimate.
CONCIUSION

The power of the courts and Congress to eliminate the horizontal
precedential force of judicial opinions has been the subject of much
lively judicial and scholarly discourse of late on the nature of the judicial power and the extent of legislative authority to control its mode of
operation. By way of adding to this discussion: at the dawn of the
Republic, the new federal courts were subject to the (common) law
that they should, roughly speaking, defer to reasonable precedents,
and separation of powers forbade and forbids them from seizing more
discretionary power by abandoning this constraint. The principle that
courts may not seize power does not, however, prevent Congress from
granting it. Congress could, consistent with separation-of-powers principles and pursuant to its Sweeping Clause power, free the courts from
the horizontal stare decisis effects of many precedents or categories of
precedents. The limitation on this power is that Congress may not so
increase judicial discretion as to transform judges into legislators. In
the past, the nondelegation doctrine has provided the lens for determining the maximum amount of discretion enforcement officials may
exercise. It evolved into its current toothless state in a system that
expects judicial deference to precedent, and undermining this expectation with stare-decisis-stripping statutes could cause courts to at312 For a forceful discussion of how the certiorari power transforms judges into
lawmakers with agendas, see generally Peter L. Strauss, Courts or Tribunal? Federal
Courts and the Common Law, 53 At. L. REv. 891 (2002).
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tempt to enforce it more vigorously. That said, one can conceive of
many such statutes which should be well within Congress's power, for
example, it could strip all future Supreme Court five-to-four opinions
of their horizontal force or directly authorize the circuit courts' nonprecedent rules.
On more normative notes, one can only speculate concerning the
ultimate and perhaps complex effects on the body politic and constitutional interpretation of acknowledging a congressional power to
eliminate the horizontal precedential force ofjudicial opinions-particularly were Congress to exercise it with the hope of influencing the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution. That said, in a
republic committed to balancing the rule of law and the sovereignty of
the people, it would seem fair to hazard that majoritarian voices
should be permitted to participate in the process of constitutional interpretation insofar as they can do so without unduly undermining
the rule of law. Given that Congress could never use its "stripping"
power to force a constitutional construction it favored on the Court, it
is not obvious that permitting this majoritarian institution such a limited but formal voice in the "constitutional conversation" would have
such an effect. And, to invoke the Father-of-our-Constitution argument, Madison might approve.
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